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Abstract
The degree of bank competition as well as firms’ and households’ participation
in the domestic banking system differ considerably in emerging economies (EMEs)
relative to advanced economies (AEs). We build a small-open-economy model with
endogenous firm entry, monopolistic banks, household and firm heterogeneity in par-
ticipation in the banking system, and labor search to analyze the labor market and
aggregate consequences of financial participation and banking reforms in EMEs. We
find that there is a pre-reform threshold of firm participation in the banking system
below which reform implementation leads to sharper unemployment and aggregate
fluctuations amid foreign interest rate and aggregate productivity shocks. Our find-
ings suggest that comprehensive banking reforms that foster household participation
and bank competition in tandem can reduce labor market and aggregate volatility, but
only under a high-enough pre-reform level of firm participation in the banking system
and a non-negligible increase in bank competition.
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1 Introduction
Amid increasing globalization and cross-country financial linkages, domestic banking and
financial participation reforms are an important policy instrument. However, the extent to
which such reforms have a differential impact in developing and emerging market economies
(EMEs) compared to advanced economies (AEs) is not well understood. Does one size fit
all across countries in terms of such reforms? Do the unique structural characteristics of
EMEs’ domestic financial systems—in particular, the limited degree of domestic financial
participation among firms and households, the associated distribution of employment across
firms, and EMEs’ vulnerability to foreign financial shocks relative to AEs—matter for the
domestic labor market and aggregate outcomes of reforms? The answers to these questions
are important as EMEs have recently put forth several banking and financial participation
reform initiatives.1
This paper sheds light on these questions by building a small-open-economy (SOE) RBC
model with: endogenous firm entry; a monopolistically-competitive banking sector; labor
market frictions; and household and firm heterogeneity in participation in the domestic
banking system where productivity and foreign interest rate shocks are the main drivers
of aggregate fluctuations. The model captures the fact that EMEs firm and household
participation in the domestic banking system differs from that in AEs in four key respects.2
First, the majority of firms in EMEs do not participate in the domestic banking system.
Second, these firms account for a significant share of total employment and job creation
(Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2006; Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Mart´ınez Per´ıa, 2007; IFC,
2010, 2013; Ayyagari, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2011). In contrast, the majority of
firms in AEs have access to (and use) bank credit. Third, less than 50 (more than 90) percent
of the population in EMEs (AEs) participates in the domestic banking system, as measured
by the rates of account ownership at financial institutions (Global Financial Development
Report, 2014, henceforth GFDR, 2014). Fourth, EMEs’ banking sectors tend to be less
competitive relative to those in AEs.
1See Prati, Gaetano Onorato, and Papageorgiou (2013), Hollweg, Lederman, and Mitra (2015), and
Dabla-Norris, Ho, and Kyobe (2016), among others, for evidence on structural reforms.
2We document the following facts in Section 2.
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As a benchmark, we calibrate the model to reflect EME levels of: (1) bank competition
(as reflected in higher bank net interest margins); (2) household participation in the banking
system; and (3) firm participation via bank-credit usage. We characterize the short- and
long-run consequences of financial by bringing (1) and (2) closer to AE standards.3
Our analysis yields four main results. First, amid a low pre-reform level of firm participa-
tion in the banking system (as observed in EMEs), bolstering households’ participation from
an initially (EME-consistent) low level without fostering bank competition leads to higher
unemployment volatility; a fall in the countercyclicality of the trade balance; and sharper
aggregate fluctuations in the post-reform equilibrium.
Second, fostering bank competition without increasing households’ participation in the
banking system leads to reductions, albeit quantitatively limited, in labor market and aggre-
gate volatility, as well as a fall in the countercyclicality of the trade balance in the post-reform
equilibrium. Thus, comprehensive banking reform—that is, a joint increase in bank compe-
tition and households’ participation—leads to higher unemployment volatility, an unambigu-
ous reduction in the countercyclicality of the trade balance and, at best, muted reductions
in aggregate fluctuations. This stands in contrast with the unambiguous volatility-reducing
effects of reforms in more standard environments based on full participation of firms in the
banking system. Importantly, by influencing consumption dynamics across reform equilibria,
foreign interest rate shocks play a significant role in determining the extent to which reforms
have non-negligible effects on cyclical volatility.
Third, turning to reform-induced transitional dynamics at EME levels of firm partici-
pation, reforms entail short-term reductions in consumption and investment (as well as an
increase in foreign debt) that ultimately fuel firm creation and lead to higher long-term out-
put, consumption, and investment, lower unemployment, and a higher trade balance-output
ratio. Finally, we show that the adverse impact of reforms on volatility and the short-term
costs along the transition path towards the post-reform steady state are decreasing in the
3Concrete policy examples of greater household participation in the banking system include: legislation
that reduces excessive paperwork requirements and costs of opening and using deposit/savings accounts
(without compromising financial stability); the expansion of reach-out efforts to unbanked households via
advertising and information campaigns; and efforts to support the adoption of technologies that facilitate
transactions for households, among others. Given our objectives, we abstract from explicitly modeling any
given particular policy and instead consider these policies’ implications when reflected in higher household
participation in the banking system.
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pre-reform level of firm participation in the banking system: above a pre-reform firm par-
ticipation threshold of roughly 0.30 (which is slightly above the average share of financially-
included firms in EMEs), reforms do reduce labor market and aggregate volatility without
entailing short-run costs during the transition to the post-reform steady-state.
The intuition behind our results traces back to how reforms affect financially-included and
-excluded households’ consumption dynamics, and how these dynamics feed into firm creation
decisions and firms’ employment and investment decisions, ultimately shaping labor market
and aggregate dynamics. Bolstering household participation in the banking system for a
given (low) level of bank competition reduces (increases) financially-excluded (financially-
included) households’ average labor income and makes their consumption more (less) volatile.
Higher (lower) consumption volatility makes firms’ discounting of the future more (less)
volatile, which translates into more (less) volatile financially-excluded-firm (-included-firm)
vacancy creation, investment, as well as more (less) volatile firm creation among financially-
excluded (-included) households.
Despite the fact that financially-excluded firms represent a much smaller share of the uni-
verse of firms under the reform, their more sensitive response via labor demand, investment,
and firm creation contributes to higher labor market and aggregate volatility. Conversely,
bolstering bank competition for a given (low) level of household participation fosters firm
entry among firms that participate in the banking system, employment creation and in-
vestment, and labor income. However, financially-excluded firms also benefit from this via
improvements in their relative price, which bolster firm entry, investment, and wages among
these firms as well. As a result, both financially-included and -excluded households enjoy
higher consumption, with financially-included households and firms benefiting dispropor-
tionately more from the reform. This stabilizes cyclical consumption dynamics across all
households, which contributes to smoother fluctuations in employment creation and invest-
ment, and ultimately leads to smaller unemployment and output fluctuations.
Thus, under comprehensive banking reform (reflected in both greater household partic-
ipation that matches AE standards and bank competition), the effect of greater household
participation is quantitatively-dominating force due to the relatively large gap in household
participation between EMEs and AEs. Importantly, this dominance diminishes and even-
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tually vanishes when the pre-reform share of firms that participate in the banking system
surpasses the 50 percent mark since these firms increasingly account for the bulk of aggregate
economic activity and therefore drive aggregate dynamics. As such, for a large-enough share
of pre-reform firm participation, banking reforms not only have a volatility-reducing effect,
but also entail no short-term costs (reflected in reduced consumption) associated with the
transition to the post-reform steady state.
Finally, we note that the presence of foreign interest rate shocks (via their impact on
consumption dynamics) is important for characterizing the effects of reforms on cyclical
labor market and aggregate dynamics in EMEs. Importantly, the influence of productivity
shocks on post-reform dynamics is greater—implying that the influence of interest rate shocks
is smaller—the greater is the pre-reform share of firm participation (i.e., the closer the
economy is to AE standards pre-reform). These findings are consistent with the relative
relevance of foreign interest rate shocks in EME business cycles, but also stress the relevance
of considering such shocks (or financial shocks more generally) in the analysis of banking
reforms in EMEs.
Our work is closest to the literatures on endogenous firm entry and business cycles (Bil-
biie, Ghironi, and Melitz , 2012, henceforth BGM; Etro and Colciago, 2010); endogenous
entry and labor market dynamics (Shao and Silos, 2013; Colciago and Rossi, 2015); and en-
dogenous firm entry amid a monopolistic banking system (Mandelman, 2010; Totzek, 2011;
La Croce and Rossi, 2015; Rossi, 2015).4 Our work is also related to recent theoretical
work on: financial development and firm dynamics and firm dynamics and reforms amid
frictionless labor markets (Arellano, Bai, and Zhang, 2012; D’Erasmo and Moscoso-Boedo,
2012; Buera, Moll, and Shin, 2013; Buera and Shin, 2017); financial development, frictional
heterogeneous labor markets, and business cycles (Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro, 2017;
4Shao and Silos (2013) show that a model with endogenous firm entry and labor search frictions can
explain the cyclical movements in U.S. income shares. Colciago and Rossi (2015) show that a similar
model with Cournot competition can explain the empirical response of unemployment and price markups to
productivity shocks in the U.S. Mandelman (2010) shows that an imperfectly competitive banking sector can
amplify business cycles in EMEs. Totzek (2011) shows that endogenous bank entry a` la BGM contributes
to successfully reproducing the cyclical dynamics of U.S. financial and macro variables. La Croce and Rossi
(2015) find that the interaction between endogenous firm entry and monopolistically competitive banks
amplifies business cycle fluctuations. See Olivero (2010) for earlier work on business cycles amid deep habits
in banking that abstracts from endogenous firm entry.
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Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez, 2017a,b); as well as well-known work on
financial shocks and business cycles in EMEs (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue,
2006).5 The joint inclusion of labor search frictions and endogenous firm entry in our frame-
work builds on a growing set of studies on structural reforms in goods and labor markets,
which have centered primarily on AEs (Cacciatore and Fiori, 2016; Cacciatore, Ghironi, and
Fiori, 2016; Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi, 2016a,b). Finally, closest to our focus on
banking reforms, business cycles, and endogenous firm entry are recent quantitative studies
on banking deregulation and macroeconomic dynamics by Stebunovs (2008) and Cacciatore,
Ghironi, and Stebunovs (2015), which our framework thoroughly builds on. Importantly,
these studies focus on AEs and abstract from considering employment dynamics and the
role of firm and household heterogeneity in banking-system participation, both of which are
central to our work and main findings.
All told, our main contributions are fourfold. First, our study is the first to focus on
the relevance of the depth of participation in the banking system for the short-run labor
market and macro consequences of banking reforms. Second, we focus on EMEs, which
have received little attention in the growing literature on macro dynamics and structural
reforms. Third, we merge a tractable monopolistic banking system, endogenous firm entry,
and equilibrium unemployment amid empirically-factual heterogeneous firm and household
participation in the banking system. Fourth, our results stress the central role of this pre-
reform heterogeneity for characterizing the business cycle implications of banking reforms
in EMEs. More broadly, our results suggest that banking reforms in AEs, where there are
high levels of incumbent firm participation in the banking system, have positive business
cycle effects and no short-run transition costs whereas that may not necessarily be the
case in EMEs if reforms are implemented amid low pre-reform firm participation shares in
the banking system. This result is important since many EMEs and developing economies
currently have low firm participation shares.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence
5For recent work on labor and goods market reforms that incorporates informality, which is a prevalent
feature of EMEs, see Munkacsi and Saxegaard (2017). Also, for work on firm financial inclusion and inequal-
ity, see Dabla-Norris et al. (2015). Their work abstracts from the cyclical implications of deeper financial
inclusion.
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on cross-country domestic banking development that supports our theoretical framework.
Section 3 presents our framework. Section 4 explores the quantitative implications of banking
reforms that bring a representative EME to AE standards. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Background
The following evidence illustrates key differences in participation in the banking system and
banking competition between AEs and EMEs and provides empirical support to the modeling
framework presented in Section 3.
Table 1 shows that, compared to AEs, in EMEs both firms and individuals participate
much less in the domestic banking system and banking competition is much lower. Specif-
ically, The second column shows that over 50 percent of firms in AEs have bank loans, but
less than 25 percent of firms in EMEs do so.6 As such, the participation of firms in the
banking system via bank credit usage in AEs is twice as high as in EMEs. The third col-
umn shows that individuals’ participation in the domestic banking system are considerably
lower in EMEs relative to AEs. Indeed, less than half of the population in EMEs has an
account at financial institutions, compared to more than 90 percent in AEs.7 The fourth
and fifth columns show that competition in the domestic banking system is much lower in
EMEs compared to AEs: bank net interest margins—a measure of banks’ loan profitability
and therefore a proxy of competition in the banking sector—in AEs are less than 40 percent
compared to EMEs; and the Bank Lerner Index is 30 percent higher in EMEs compared to
AEs. Finally, the last column of Table 1 shows a complementary measure of domestic access
to the banking system: on a per population scale the number of bank branches in AEs is
well over twice as that in EMEs.8
6There is heterogeneity within EMEs, with the share of firms with bank loans ranging from roughly 10
percent in particular EMEs to more than 50 percent in others, but the fact that AEs have larger shares of
firm participation in the banking system relative to EMEs continues to hold.
7Evidence on usage of financial accounts in EMEs and AEs confirms a similar pattern: virtually all
individuals in AEs have used their accounts for transactions in the recent past. This stands in contrast with
only a small fraction of individuals in EMEs having done so (the correlation between the share of individuals
in the economy with an account at financial institutions and the share of individuals depositing/withdrawing
at least once in a typical month is 0.999). For similar evidence, see Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Martinez
Peria (2007).
8The Lerner Index summarizes the degree of market power in the banking system, with a higher index
implying a less competitive environment (see the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database).
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Table 1: Firms’ Bank Financing, Household Participation in Domestic Banking System, and Bank
Competition in Advanced and Emerging Economies
Country Share of Account at Bank Net Bank Commercial
Group Firms with Fin. Institutions Interest Lerner Bank Branches
Bank Loans (% of Pop. Margins Index Per 100,000 Adults
(Median, % Firms) Age 15+) (%) (Number)
AEs 0.56 96.4 1.69 0.198 28.7
EMEs 0.26 42.2 4.30 0.240 13.0
Sources: Eurostat and Survey of Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE, 2011) (for the share of firms with
bank loans, advanced economies, or AEs) and IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database 2010 (for the share of
total (formal and informal) firms in AEs, and for all relevant evidence on emerging economies, or EMEs),
World Bank Global Financial Inclusion Database (account at financial institutions, 2011), World Bank
Financial Development Structure (net interest margins, average 2000-2011), World Bank Global Financial
Development Database (Lerner Index, average 2000-2011), and IMF Financial Access Survey (number of
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults, 2011). See Section A.1 of the Appendix for further details.
Notes: Similar evidence on firms’ usage of bank credit and households’ participation in the domestic banking
system is presented in Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017b).
Amid the backdrop of Table 1, it is important to note that across countries limited firm
participation in the banking system is associated with the prevalence of (micro and small)
household-operated firms. These firms’ internal accounts are often indistinguishable from
those of their owners.9 Therefore, firms that do not participate in the banking system are
more likely than not to be owned and operated by households who do not participate in the
system either.10 Moreover, these firms account for more than 50 percent of employment in
EMEs, compared to roughly 15 percent in AEs (OECD, 2009; European Social Survey; IFC,
2010, 2013).
Figure 1 reinforces the evidence in Table 1 by using a more extensive list of countries
(see Section A.1 in the Appendix for details). This figure shows that economies with lower
domestic banking development as proxied for by the share of individuals with an account
Equality-of-means tests suggest that the differences in net interest margins, the Lerner Index, and the number
of bank branches per capita between AEs and EMEs (as well as differences in participation in the banking
system) are statistically significant at conventional levels.
9Using World Bank Enterprise Survey data (which only includes formal firms), we find a strong and
negative relationship between the share of the population with a financial account and the percent of firms
with legal status of sole proprietorship (which is the best available proxy of the degree of household-owned
firms).
10Indeed, given the nature of financial markets, it is unlikely for the majority of (household) firm owners
to own firms that participate in the banking system without doing so themselves (via financial account own-
ership). This is particularly applicable to ownership of micro and small firms, which tend to be unregistered
(informal) and account for a large share of the universe of firms in EMEs (see IFC, 2010, 2013).
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at financial institutions tend to have: (1) higher bank net interest margins (top left panel);
(2) a higher bank Lerner Index (i.e., less bank competition, top right panel); (3) a smaller
number of commercial bank branches per capita (bottom left panel); and a smaller share of
firms with bank credit lines (bottom right panel).
Figure 1: Domestic Banking Development, Firm Structure, and Economic Development
Across Countries
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Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank Global Financial Development Report 2015, IFC
Enterprise Finance Database 2010, Penn World Tables. Notes: The lines in each of the subfigures represent
regression lines. Each observation represents a country. The full list of countries is presented in the Appendix.
Similarly strong patterns hold when we restrict the country sample to include only AEs and EMEs. ***
denote significance at the 1 percent level.
3 The Model
The small open economy is comprised of households, banks, and firms. There is a unit mass
of households, which is divided into two categories: financially-included (i) households with
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measure 0 < λ < 1 of household members, and financially-excluded (e) households with
measure (1− λ) of members.11
At the heart of the production structure are two general firm categories, each of which
comprised of monopolistically-competitive wholesale firms and their perfectly-competitive
intermediate-goods suppliers. Each wholesale category has an unbounded number of po-
tential entrants such that the number of wholesale firms in each category is endogenous.
In turn, these firms depend on inputs supplied by perfectly-competitive intermediate-goods
firms in their own category.
The first category of wholesale firms is comprised of financially-included (i) firms whose
creation relies on bank credit to finance the sunk costs of entry of new firms. In turn, an ex-
ogenous number of banks operating in a monopolistically-competitive market compete over
the number of loans supplied to these firms in a Cournot fashion. These two assumptions
follow directly from the frameworks in Stebunovs (2008) and Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Ste-
bunovs (2015). The second category of wholesale firms is comprised of financially-excluded
(e) firms whose creation relies on resources from e households to cover the sunk costs of
entry of new firms (as opposed to bank credit in the case of i firms).12
Differentiated output from the two categories of wholesale firms is bundled by a perfectly-
competitive retail firm that produces a final good. Intermediate-goods firms, regardless of
their category, accumulate capital and demand labor, and labor is subject to search frictions,
which leads to equilibrium unemployment.13 Following the EME business cycle literature,
aggregate productivity and foreign interest rate shocks drive aggregate fluctuations.
Banks, wholesale, and intermediate-goods i firms are owned by i households. The latter
supply deposits to banks and hold foreign debt. The members of i households are employed
in intermediate-goods i firms. In turn, e households own wholesale and intermediate-goods
e firms and their members are employed in e intermediate-goods firms.14 There is perfect
11Given these assumptions, we use the terms ”share of financially-included/-excluded households” and
”share of individuals in financially-included/-excluded households” interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
12Evidence for EMEs suggests that household savings are one of the main sources of financing for the
creation of micro and small firms (i.e. firms that, on average, have little to no access to bank credit in these
economies) (Kantis, Ishida, and Komori, 2002; IFC 2010, 2013; GFDR, 2014).
13For a similar separation between labor search frictions and endogenous firm entry, see Cacciatore, Du-
val, Fiori, and Ghironi (2016). Assuming a capital producer that supplies capital to both categories of
intermediate-goods firms does not change our conclusions.
14The Appendix explores the implications of different firm-ownership assumptions. Our main conclusions
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consumption insurance within each household but not across households (a standard as-
sumption). Absent endogenous labor force participation, the total labor force is normalized
to 1.
Section A.9 of the Appendix presents the details of a non-trivial modification to our
model where we allow members from each household category can search for employment
across intermediate-goods-firm categories and not just within their own category. As the
Appendix confirms, our main conclusions remain unchanged in this richer environment.
3.1 Final Goods and Wholesale Aggregator Firms
A representative final goods firm aggregates total output from each firm category Yi,t and Ye,t
to create a final good Yt. Specifically, the firm maximizes profits Πa,t = [PtYt − Pi,tYi,t − Pe,tYe,t]
subject to the CES aggregator
Yt =
[
(1− αy)
1
φy (Yi,t)
φy−1
φy + α
1
φy
y (Ye,t)
φy−1
φy
] φy
φy−1
, (1)
where Pt is the aggregate price level and Pi,t, Pe,t are the sectoral price indices, 0 < αy < 1,
and φy > 0 determines how substitutable Yi,t and Ye,t are in total output. The corresponding
demand functions for the two sectoral output bundles can be written as:
Pi,t/Pt = (1− αy)
1
φy (Yt/Yi,t)
1
φy , (2)
and
Pe,t/Pt = α
1
φy
y (Yt/Ye,t)
1
φy , (3)
where Pt =
[
(1− αy) (Pi,t)
1−φy + αy (Pe,t)
1−φy
] 1
φy−1
.
Perfectly competitive wholesale output aggregators in each firm category j ∈ {e, i} de-
mand differentiated goods from wholesale firms in each of the two categories. In particular,
the sectoral output bundle from firm category j is Yj,t =
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
yj,t(ωj)
ε−1
ε dωj
) ε
ε−1
, where
ε is the elasticity of substitution, and yj,t(ωj) is differentiated output produced by firm ωj
within each firm category j. Ωj is the subset of differentiated goods within each firm category
do not change.
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j that, in principle, the wholesale output aggregator firm can potentially purchase from (only
a fraction of Ωj ends up being produced each period). The corresponding price subindex
is given by Pj,t =
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
pj,t(ωj)
1−εdωj
) 1
1−ε
where pj,t(ωj) is the price of the differentiated
good produced by firm ωj in category j. The optimal demand for differentiated goods in
each firm category, which wholesale firms are subject to, are given by
yi,t(ωi) = (1− αy) (ρi,t(ωi))
−ε
(
Pi,t
Pt
)ε−φy
Yi,t, (4)
and
ye,t(ωe) = αy (ρe,t(ωe))
−ε
(
Pe,t
Pt
)ε−φy
Ye,t, (5)
where the real price ρj,t(ωj) = pj,t(ωj)/Pt for j ∈ {e, i} .
3.2 Incumbent Wholesale Firms
For an incumbent firm ωj in category j ∈ {e, i} , individual profits are given by dj,t(ωj) =
[ρj,t(ωj)−mcj,t] yj,t(ωj) where mcj,t is the price of intermediate output in category j. Each
firm maximizes Et
∑∞
s=t Ξ
j
s|t[(1−δ)
s−tdj,s(ωj)] subject to their demand from wholesale output
aggregator firms, where 0 < δ < 1 is the exogenous exit probability and Ξjs|t is household
j’s stochastic discount factor (defined further below). The solution to this problem yields
ρj,t(ωj) = µmcj,t where the markup µ = ε/(ε− 1).
Following the literature on endogenous firm entry (BGM), there is an unbounded number
of potential wholesale entrants into firm category j ∈ {e, i}. Let Nj,t be the mass of firms
in category j that are currently producing in period t. New entrants NE,jt in period t face
a one-period production lag, so that they start producing in t + 1, and all firms (whether
incumbent or new entrants) exit with exogenous probability δ at the end of each period.
Then, the current mass of firms in category j is given by Nj,t = (1− δ) (Nj,t−1 +NE,jt−1) .
Potential new firms in j need to incur an exogenous sunk entry cost ψj (expressed in terms
of final goods) in order to enter their category.15 Banks provide financing for the entirety of
15This cost can embody a number of factors, including physical and technological costs of entry as well as
regulatory expenses and financial and institutional barriers (see, for example, Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and
Ghironi, 2016a,b). Expressing the sunk entry costs in terms of labor does not change any of our results.
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wholesale i firms’ entry costs, whereas e households use internal resources to cover wholesale
e firms’ entry costs.
Entry of Wholesale e Firms The entry cost for wholesale e firms is financed using
internal resources from e households. Since firms that would enter in period t anticipate
their future profits post-entry, the present discounted value of expected profits obtained
from period t + 1 onwards is given by ee,t(ωe) = Et
∑∞
s=t+1 Ξ
e
s|t(1 − δ)
s−tde,s(ωe). Free entry
implies that in equilibrium and after imposing symmetry, ee,t(ωe) = ee,t = ψe obtains.
Banks and Entry of Wholesale i Firms We follow the exposition in Stebunovs (2008)
and Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs (2015) in modeling wholesale i firms’ reliance on
monopolistically-competitive banks and the banking structure. Since our objective is to
explore the impact of banking reforms as reflected in exogenous changes in the degree of
bank competition, we abstract from explicitly modeling the underlying reason for new i
firms’ dependence on external finance from banks. As such, we follow related literature
and assume that potential i firms require bank funds to finance their sunk entry costs.
Furthermore, we assume that banks have enough power to set loan repayments to extract
the entirety of i firms’ profits di,t, and that each new firm requires a single loan to finance its
sunk entry cost (i.e., the number of firms is the same as the number of loans; see Cacciatore,
Ghironi, and Stebunovs, 2015).16
An exogenous number of banks H compete over the number of loans supplied to wholesale
i firms in a market characterized by Cournot competition. As noted in Cacciatore, Ghironi,
and Stebunovs (2015), we can think of H as embodying the number of banks in the economy
along with the number of locations of each bank. Since we are interested in banking reforms
that increase bank competition and participation in the banking system, without loss of
generality we assume that each bank has a fixed number of locations such that a change in
H represents a change in the number of banks (which in turn changes the amount of bank
credit available).17 In particular, bank h ∈ H caters to an endogenous number Ni(h) of
16This assumption is made for simplicity. Assuming that banks set the interest rate on loans, that only a
fraction of entry costs is financed with bank credit, or that banks finance wholesale i firms’ entry costs and
intermediate-goods i firms’ investment (described further below) does not change any of our conclusions.
17The fact that the number of banks and their locations are more limited in EMEs relative to AEs is
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wholesale i firms and chooses how many potential wholesale i entrants NE,it it supplies new
loans to. This decision is made in tandem with other banks, taking the latter’s choices over
loans as given and also taking into account firms’ optimal decisions over their own pricing
after entry. Since wholesale i entrants end up exiting before production takes place with
exogenous probability δ, the evolution of bank h’s stock of i firms in its portfolio is given by
Ni,t(h) = (1− δ) (Ni,t−1(h) +NE,it−1(h)). Then, the total number of incumbent wholesale i
firms and i entrants is Ni,t =
∑
hNi,t(h) and NE,it =
∑
hNE,it(h), respectively.
Since i households are the ultimate owners of banks and all i firms, bank h’s problem
at the beginning of period t is to choose the desired number of loans Ni,t+1(h) and new
loans NE,it(h) to maximize the present discounted value of profits E0
∑∞
t=0 Ξ
i
t|0pib,t(h) subject
to bank profits pib,t(h) = Ni,t(h)di,t + bt+1(h) − ψiNE,it(h) − Rtbt(h) and the balance sheet
constraint bt+1(h) = ψiNE,it(h), where di,t are wholesale i firm profits, b(h) are household
deposits in bank h, and R is the domestic gross real interest rate on bank deposits. Denoting
the value to bank h of having one more active wholesale i firm in its portfolio by Qt(h), we
have
Qt(h) = EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
di,t+1 +Ni,t+1(h)
[
∂di,t+1
∂Ni,t+1
∂Ni,t+1
∂Ni,t+1(h)
]
+ (1− δ)Qt+1(h)
}
. (6)
This expression is identical to the one in Stebunovs (2008) and Cacciatore, Ghironi, and
Stebunovs (2015). The term in brackets on the right-hand-side captures bank h’s internal-
ization of the fact that having an additional firm in its portfolio implies more competition
for all other firms in its portfolio, which in turn lowers profits for all incumbent firms in the
latter (this occurs despite the fact that, for a given level of firm profits, expanding the loan
portfolio brings in additional revenue for bank h). The third term on the right-hand-side
captures the continuation value if the wholesale i firm survives into the next period, which
occurs with exogenous probability (1− δ).
Bank h will continue to supply loans to wholesale i firm entrants until the marginal
benefit of having a loan, Qt(h), is equal to the expected marginal cost, where this marginal
consistent with evidence on the number of ATMs per 1000 people and the number of bank branches per
100,000 individuals, which proxy for bank accessibility, as well as the actual number of banks in the data
(see, for example, GFDR, 2014).
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cost is given by the discounted cost of entry, taking into account that new entrants exit
before production with exogenous probability δ. That is,
Qt(h) = Qt =
(
1
1− δ
)
ψi. (7)
This expression, which effectively characterizes wholesale i firms’ optimal entry condition
via banks’ decisions to fund entrants, is also identical to the one in Stebunovs (2008) and
Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs (2015).
Absent idiosyncratic differences across banks, all banks make the same decisions so that
we can write
Qt = EtΞ
i
t+1|t
[(
1−
1
H
)
di,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
]
. (8)
Intuitively, a larger number of banks H expands the number of firms by increasing the supply
of loans and reduces a given bank’s market power. Importantly, banks’ net interest margin
is defined as [Ni,tdi,t − Rt−1bt−1] /Ni,tQt, which is decreasing in the number of banks H in
the economy.18
3.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate-goods firms in category j ∈ {e, i} are perfectly competitive and act as suppliers
to wholesale firms in their respective category.19 They produce using internally-accumulated
capital and labor, and labor is subject to search and matching frictions. In particular, let
m(uj,t, vj,t) = uj,tvj,t/(u
ξ
j,t+v
ξ
j,t)
1/ξ, ξ > 0, be a constant-returns-to-scale matching function in
firm category j whose inputs are household-j unemployed individuals uj,t and vacancies vj,t
(Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson, 2000).20 Then, the category-specific job-finding and job-
filling probabilities are defined as f(θj,t) = vj,t/(u
ξ
j,t+ v
ξ
j,t)
1/ξ and q(θj,t) = uj,t/(u
ξ
j,t+ v
ξ
j,t)
1/ξ,
18This is consistent with the evidence on bank competition, net interest margins, and firm participation
presented in Section 2.
19For simplicity, we assume that intermediate-goods firms in one category cannot act as suppliers to
wholesale firms in the other category. Given our interest in labor market dynamics, this assumption is
not crucial for our results. The Appendix shows that a richer version of our model where households can
search for employment opportunities across firm categories (and not just within their own category) does
not change our main conclusions.
20This particular functional form guarantees that matching probabilities are always bounded between 0
and 1. Our results remain the same if we adopt a Cobb-Douglas matching specification.
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respectively, where market tightness θj,t ≡ vj,t/uj,t.
Intermediate-goods firms in category j choose capital accumulation kj,t+1, vacancies vj,t,
and desired employment nj,t+1 to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 Ξ
j
t|0Πj,t subject to the definition of firm
profits
Πj,t = mcj,tzj,tn
1−α
j,t k
α
j,t − wj,tnj,t − κjvj,t − ij,t,
the evolution of capital21
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + ij,t, (9)
and the perceived evolution of employment
nj,t+1 = (1− ρ
n
j ) (nj,t + vj,tq(θj,t)) , (10)
where mcj,t is the real price of intermediate goods, κj is the flow cost of posting a vacancy,
and ρnj is the exogenous separation probability in category j. zj,t is exogenous category-
specific productivity and follows a stochastic process. We obtain standard capital Euler
equations and job creation conditions for each category j:
1 = EtΞ
j
t+1|t
[
1 + αmcj,t+1zj,t+1n
1−α
j,t+1k
α−1
j,t+1 − δ
]
, (11)
and
κj
q(θj,t)
= (1− ρnj )EtΞ
j
t+1|t
{
(1− α)mcj,t+1zj,t+1n
−α
j,t+1k
a
j,t+1 − wj,t+1 +
κj
q(θj,t+1)
}
. (12)
The intuition behind these conditions is standard: firms equate the expected marginal cost
of posting a vacancy to the expected marginal benefit. Importantly, recall that optimal
pricing behavior among wholesale firms implies that ρj,t(ωj) = µmcj,t. Therefore, changes
in the number of wholesale firms in the two categories will affect the hiring and investment
decisions of intermediate-goods firms via mcj,t.
22
We assume bilateral Nash bargaining between workers and firms. Denoting by η the bar-
21We include standard capital adjustment costs as part of our quantitative analysis but abstract from
including them here for expositional brevity.
22For a similar, one-sector employment structure without banks, see Cacciatore et al. (2016a).
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gaining power of workers and by χj the contemporaneous value of searching for employment
in firm category j ∈ {e, i}, the Nash real wage in j is standard:
wj,t = η
[
(1− α)mcj,tzj,tn
−α
j,t k
α
j,t + κjθj,t
]
+ (1− η)χj. (13)
3.4 Households
Utility is of the CRRA form for all households: u(cj) = c
1−σ
j /(1−σ) with σ > 0 for j ∈ {e, i} .
A fraction 0 < λ < 1 of the population belongs to financially-included (i) households. The
remaining share of the population (1− λ) belongs to financially-excluded (e) households.
Financially-Included (i) Households Households choose consumption ci,t, bank de-
posits bt+1, foreign debt holdings b
∗
t+1, and the ownership shares in banks xb,t+1(h) to maxi-
mize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ci,t) subject to the budget constraint:
ci,t+bt+1+R
∗
t b
∗
t+
ηb
2
(b∗t+1)
2+xb,t+1
∑
h∈H
eb,t(h) = Rtbt+b
∗
t+1+wi,tni,t+χiui,t+xb,t
∑
h∈H
[pib,t(h) + eb,t(h)]+Πi,t,
(14)
where R∗t is the (time-varying) gross real foreign interest rate and households face foreign
debt adjustment costs (a standard assumption in SOE models). eb,t(h) is the price of of
a claim to bank h’s profits pib,t(h), and Πi,t are profits from intermediate-goods i firms.
Unemployment among i household members is ui,t = λ− ni,t.
23 Of note, in our context and
for our purposes, there is no differentiation between owning a deposit bank account and
using it.24 The first-order conditions yield the following standard Euler equations
u′(ci,t) = Rt+1βEtu
′(ci,t+1) and 1 = R
∗
t+1βEt
u′(ci,t+1)
u′(ci,t)
+ ηbb
∗
t+1 (15)
23In principle, households are also subject to the perceived evolution of employment ni,t+1 = (1 −
ρni ) (ni,t + ui,tf(θi,t)). Absent endogenous labor force participation, this law of motion is taken as given
by the household and employment is mainly demand-driven.
24This is consistent with the evidence on having a financial account and using it, which was briefly discussed
in Section 2.
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where Ξit+1|t ≡ βu
′(ci,t+1)/u
′(ci,t). The Euler equation for share holdings of banks (after
imposing symmetry) is
eb,t = EtΞ
i
t+1|t [pib,t+1 + eb,t+1] , (16)
Intuitively, households equate the marginal cost of acquiring an additional bank share (the
price of a claim to bank profits, eb) to the expected marginal benefit of doing so (given by
discounted future profits and the capital gain from holding bank shares).
Of note, foreign interest rate shocks are one possible manifestation of financial shocks
that affect, among other things, the provision of credit by the domestic banking system.
Considering other types of financial shocks that affect this provision of credit—such as shocks
to ψi which, given banks’ balance sheet constraint bt+1(h) = ψiNE,it(h), can be broadly seen
as shocks to banks’ costs of providing resources for new firm ventures, which in turn affects
firm creation—has qualitatively similar effects on labor markets and output to those from
interest rate shocks.
Financially-Excluded (e) Households Households choose consumption ce,t and the
ownership shares in household-dependent e firms xe,t+1 to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ce,t) subject
to the budget constraint:
ce,t + xe,t+1(NE,et +Ne,t)ee,t = we,tne,t + χeue,t + xe,tNe,t [de,t + ee,t] + Πe,t, (17)
where ee,t is the price of a claim to wholesale e firms’ profits de,t and Πe,t are profits from
intermediate-goods e firms.25 Unemployment among e household members is ue,t = (1 −
λ)− ne,t. The first-order conditions yield the Euler equation for e firms
ee,t = (1− δ)EtΞ
e
t+1|t [de,t+1 + ee,t+1] , (18)
where Ξet+1|t = βu
′(ce,t+1)/u
′(ce,t).
25In principle, households are also subject to the perceived evolution of employment ne,t+1 = (1 −
ρne ) (ne,t + ue,tf(θe,t)).
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3.5 Symmetric Equilibrium and Market Clearing
Intermediate goods and wholesale output markets satisfy zj,tn
1−α
j,t k
a
j,t = Nj,tyj,t for each
category j ∈ {e, i} . In turn, using the sectoral price indices and after imposing symmetry, we
have ρj,t = (Pj,t/Pt)N
1
ε−1
j,t . In addition, in equilibrium, xb,t+1 = xb,t = 1 and xe,t+1 = xe,t = 1.
Finally, the economy’s resource constraint is given by
Yt = ci,t + ce,t+ ii,t + ie,t+ κivi,t+ κeve,t+ ψiNE,it+ ψeNE,et+R
∗
t b
∗
t − b
∗
t+1 +
ηb
2
(b∗t+1)
2. (19)
We define total consumption and investment as ct = ci,t+ce,t and invt = ii,t+ie,t, respectively.
Furthermore, the total number of firms in the economy is Nt ≡ Ne,t +Ni,t.
3.6 Data-Consistent Variables
Following the literature (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2012; Cacciatore and Fiori, 2016;
Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Fiori, 2016; Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi, 2016a,b), we
note that in the presence of preferences with a “love for variety” component, any variable
expressed in terms of final consumption goods that is compared to the data should be
adjusted to reflect the fact that CPI measurements abstract from the variety component
inherent to models with endogenous firm entry. Specifically, if xm,t is a quantity in the
model expressed in final consumption units, then its empirical counterpart in the model is
given by xd,t = Ψ
1
1−φy
t xm,t where Ψt = (1−αy)N
1−φy
1−ε
i,t +αyN
1−φy
1−ε
e,t (see, for example, Cacciatore,
Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi, 2016a).
4 Quantitative Analysis
Baseline Calibration A period is a quarter. We calibrate the baseline economy to a
representative EME. We introduce standard capital adjustment costs in both intermediate-
goods firm categories: (ϕk/2) (kj,t+1/kj,t − 1)
2 kj,t, where ϕk > 0 for j = e, i. Following the
EME business cycle literature, we set σ = 2, β = 0.985, δ = 0.025, α = 0.32. Following
the literature on endogenous entry, we choose ε = 6 (alternative values do not change our
main conclusions). EMEs generally lack formal safety nets, so we initially set χj = 0 for
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j ∈ {e, i} . The steady-state gross real foreign interest rate is R∗ = 1.0019, consistent with
existing studies. We also set ϕk = 10 (alternative values do not change our conclusions).
The exogenous separation probabilities are ρnj = 0.05 for j ∈ {e, i} (Bosch and Maloney,
2008; Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez, 2017b). Based on the evidence
in Section 2, the share of individuals in financially-included households is λ = 0.42. We
set the elasticity of substitution between sectoral wholesale output φy = 5, implying a high
degree of substitutability.26 We set ze = 1 and zi = 3, which is consistent with productivity
differentials between larger firms (which generally have access to bank credit) and micro and
small firms (with little to no access to bank credit) (see La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; ILO,
2015). As a baseline, we assume symmetry in vacancy posting costs, κe = κi = κ.
We calibrate the remaining parameters ξ, κ, ψe, ψi, H, αy, and ηb to match select first-
moment targets consistent with EME averages based on the EME country sample in Table
1: a steady state unemployment rate if 8.2 percent (consistent with the average value in
our EME sample; World Development Indicators), a vacancy-posting cost of 3.5 percent of
steady-state quarterly average wages (consistent with evidence in Levy, 2007), a steady-state
sunk entry cost for i wholesale firms of one third of steady state quarterly wages (consistent
with evidence on the cost of obtaining a license (a proxy for the cost of creating a financially-
included firm) in our sample of EMEs; World Bank Enterprise Surveys), a sunk entry cost
for e firms that is roughly 70 percent of the corresponding cost for i firms (this replicates the
average extra costs faced by firms that comply with regulations in our EME sample, World
Bank Doing Business Survey), a steady state bank net interest margin of 4.30 percent (see
Table 1), a ratio of i firms to the total number of firms Ni/N of 0.26 (see Table 1), and a
steady state annual foreign debt-output ratio of 0.30 (all consistent with our EME sample).
All told, we obtain the following parameter values: ξ = 0.3809, κ = 0.0811, ψe =
0.5387, ψi = 0.7643, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9645, and ηb = 0.0013. Finally, we assume that all
26This value generates an empirically-factual positive relationship between the level of economic develop-
ment (as proxied by the level of total output) and the share of i individuals. Evidence using the World Bank
Financial Development Structure Database shows that registered firms—which are more likely to participate
in the banking system—face more direct competition from unregistered firms the less developed the banking
system is. Moreover, 70 percent of registered firms in EMEs cite direct competition from unregistered firms
as a major obstacle. A direct implication of these facts is that firm output is likely to be highly substitutable
between firm categories in economies with less developed banking systems (i.e., EMEs). The Appendix
presents results for lower values of φy for completeness.
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shocks follow independent AR(1) processes in logs: ln(xt) = (1− ρx) ln(x)+ ρx ln(xt−1)+ ε
x
t ,
where εxt ˜N(0, σx) for x = ze, zi, zr. For illustrative purposes, we assume a common shock
to sectoral productivity and set ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr.
27 Of note, we ex-
plore realistic asymmetries across firm categories (in entry costs, separation probabilities,
vacancy costs, capital shares in production, among others) as part of our robustness checks
(presented in the Appendix). These asymmetries do not change any of our main conclusions.
For completeness, Table A3 in the Appendix confirms that, under the baseline calibration,
the model replicates well-known business cycle facts in EMEs, including a relative volatility
of consumption greater than 1 and a countercyclical trade balance-output ratio.
4.1 Banking Reforms
We consider three different banking reform equilibria relative to the benchmark economy.
First, banking reform as reflected in an increase in the share of individuals in i households,
λ, from 0.42 in the baseline (pre-reform) economy to 0.96 (consistent with the share in AEs),
holding bank competition as reflected in net interest margins (and therefore the number of
banks H) at their baseline (pre-reform) levels (the column labeled (1) in Table 2). Second,
banking reform reflected in a reduction in net interest margins to AEs’ standards, holding
λ at its baseline (pre-reform) level (the column labeled (2) in Table 2). This equilibrium is
obtained by increasing the number of banks H .28 Third, banking reform reflected in a joint
increase in λ and H that replicates the level of banking sector development in AEs, that is,
an increase in λ from 0.42 to 0.96 and a reduction of 2.61 percentage points in net interest
margins (the column labeled (3) in Table 2).
We refer to the first two cases as individual banking reforms and to the last case as a
comprehensive banking reform. Of note, while the reform that bolsters household partici-
pation is particularly sizeable (and may take time to be fully implemented), considering a
reform that effectively eliminates the household participation gap between EMEs and AEs
27We implement a first-order log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions and simulate the model
for a large number of periods. All simulated data is filtered using an HP filter with smoothing parameter
1600, as we would do with real data.
28This reform entails a reduction of 2.61 percentage points in net interest margins to reach AE levels. Recall
from Subsection 3.2 that a larger number of banks H generates lower net interest margins. In what follows,
we use the terms lower net interest margins, a higher H , and greater bank competition interchangeably.
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helps to clearly illustrate the complementarities between individual reforms.
4.1.1 Steady State Reform Equilibria
Table 2 compares key steady-state variables in the baseline, pre-reform economy to the same
variables across the banking reform equilibria above.
Table 2: Steady State Under Different Banking Reform Equilibria
Variable Baseline Higher λ Higher H Higher λ
Economy and H
(1) (2) (3)
Yd 4.143 6.843 4.524 7.996
cd 2.863 4.882 3.059 5.451
cd,i 1.317 4.677 1.475 5.240
cd,e 1.546 0.205 1.585 0.211
invd 0.687 1.134 0.750 1.325
N 45.74 29.00 57.74 54.77
Ni 11.89 26.14 22.73 51.71
Ne 33.84 2.862 35.01 3.064
Ni/N 0.260 0.901 0.394 0.944
wd,i 2.530 3.811 2.963 4.479
wd,e 2.161 4.153 2.215 4.270
Labor Incomed,i 0.977 3.362 1.147 3.961
Labor Incomed,e 1.150 0.153 1.179 0.157
ni 0.386 0.882 0.387 0.885
ne 0.532 0.037 0.532 0.037
ui/u 0.414 0.960 0.408 0.960
ue/u 0.586 0.040 0.592 0.040
u 0.082 0.0812 0.081 0.079
Perc. Change in Average − 5.311 10.06 27.77
Labor Productivity
H 2.429 2.429 20.60 20.60
λ 0.420 0.960 0.420 0.960
∆ Net Int. Margin 0 0 −2.61 −2.61
(Percentage Points)
Three conclusions emerge from Table 2. First, regardless of whether banking reform is
reflected in a higher share of i individuals (a higher λ) or greater bank competition (that
is, a higher H that reduces net interest margins), reforms induce a higher steady-state
total output, consumption, and investment, and to a larger number and a larger share
of i firms in the economy. Furthermore, both individual and comprehensive reforms lead
to improvements in average labor productivity (ALP), which is consistent with existing
empirical evidence for EMEs (see, for example, Dabla-Norris, Ho, and Kyobe, 2016). Of
21
note, in all instances changes in aggregate unemployment are negligible, but changes in
employment and unemployment shares are of nontrivial magnitude.
Also, while higher bank competition alone (column (2)) has very small effects on the
sectoral allocation of employment between e and i firms, this reform has positive effects
on wages, labor income, and consumption for both household categories. In addition, this
reform expands the number of both e and i firms.29 Intuitively, a more competitive banking
system increases the supply of loans, thereby leading to an expansion of i firms without
necessarily having a large crowding-out effect among e firms.
In contrast, an individual reform that increases λ (column (1)) generates a sharp reallo-
cation of employment from e firms to i firms, a substantial reduction in total labor income
and consumption among e households (the reverse holds for i households), a sharp increase
in the number of i firms, and a large decrease in the number of e firms. Intuitively, this
occurs because the increase in λ boosts the amount of resources available to banks via a
larger share of i-household members, which in turn are devoted to i-firm creation. At the
same time, the sharp reduction in e-household members and workers naturally implies a
sharp reduction in the overall resources available for the creation of e firms. As discussed
below, the contrasting changes in the composition of consumption, employment and firms
that result from individual reforms help rationalize the differential impact of these reforms
on cyclical dynamics.
Finally, comprehensive banking reform generates higher average output levels and a larger
share of firms that participate in the banking system, thereby replicating macro outcomes
consistent with those in AEs. Notably, the effects of an increase in λ described above are
magnified amid greater bank competition, and the change in λ appears to drive the allocation
of employment, the large change in the share of i firms in the economy, and the composition
of aggregate consumption. All told, the comparison of different equilibria in Table 2 show
that banking reform has positive long-term labor market and aggregate effects.
29The increase in bank profits as a result of the reforms also contributes to i households’ change in
consumption, but this is second-order relative to the changes in labor income.
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4.1.2 Reforms and Changes in Cyclical Dynamics
The model has three key margins that can directly affect the impact of reforms: household
participation; bank competition; and firm participation. This section begins by focusing
explicitly on these first two margins, and then on the third margin. After presenting results,
we elaborate on their driving forces.
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Figure 2: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria (Baseline Calibration)
Figure 2 plots the volatility of key macro aggregates (output and consumption) and
unemployment, as well as the cyclical correlation of the trade balance-output ratio (in order
to illustrate the open-economy implications of reforms), for different combinations of banking
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reform equilibria (λ and net interest margins; the range of these variables is in line with their
empirically plausible values per the data). Unless otherwise noted, all relevant variables are
expressed in data-consistent terms.
This figure shows that in an economic environment that starts off with low pre-reform
household and firm participation levels and high net interest margins, comprehensive banking
reform as reflected in a joint increase in λ and a reduction in net interest margins does not
automatically lead to broad-based reductions in unemployment and aggregate volatility, but
does reduce the countercyclicality of the trade balance.30 While not shown, both investment
and average wage volatility follow the same pattern as output volatility. Of note, while output
becomes marginally less volatile after the reform, unemployment volatility is higher. An
important upside is that consumption becomes less volatile under a comprehensive reform.
A second key result is that reforms that boost bank competition (and therefore) reduce net
interest margins) have quantitatively stronger effects the greater is household participation
λ.
Considering individual reforms sheds light on the limited effects of comprehensive reform
on output volatility and the adverse impact on unemployment volatility. An increase in λ
holding bank competition at its pre-reform level leads to higher labor market, consumption,
and output volatility across the board. Greater bank competition limits the adverse effects
of greater participation when such participation is low pre-reform. Conversely, lower net
interest margins (which arise as a result of an increase in the number of banks H), holding
household participation at its pre-reform level, generates (small) reductions in labor market
and aggregate volatility. Taken together, it is not surprising that comprehensive reform that
brings household participation to AE levels does not reduce labor market volatility on net.
To summarize, Figure 2 offers two important messages. First, all else equal, economies
with low pre-reform levels of banking competition and firm and household participation in the
banking system will exhibit higher post-reform volatility when reforms increase household
30Of note, unemployment volatility is lower than output volatility, which is a reflection of the well-known
Shimer puzzle. Our objective is to understand how reforms change labor market and aggregate dynamics
across reform equilibria and not to quantitatively explain the high relative volatility of unemployment in the
data. As such, we leave extensions of our model that could introduce additional amplification in the labor
market for future work (see Finkelstein Shapiro, 2017, for recent work on the role of labor force participation
for quantitatively explaining unemployment dynamics in EMEs).
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participation in the banking system—effectively, doing so increases the share of individu-
als, and firms, that would be vulnerable to financial shocks—without also bolstering bank
competition. Second, amid low firm and household participation in the banking system and
a concentrated banking system, as observed in EMEs, undertaking reforms that first foster
bank competition and subsequently improve household participation can limit the potential
adverse business cycle effects of reforms.31
Of note, the findings in Figure 2 remain unchanged under different assumptions regarding
households’ firm ownership, asymmetries in vacancy posting costs, employment separation
probabilities, and capital shares, and different elasticities of substitution between sectoral
output (see Figures A3-A11 in the Appendix). Finally, shown in Table A3 in the Appendix,
the baseline economy generates a relative volatility of consumption greater than 1 and a
countercyclical trade balance-output ratio, which is consistent with well-known facts about
EME business cycles (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).32
4.2 The Importance of Firms’ Pre-Reform Participation Levels
To shed light on the importance of firms’ pre-reform level of participation in the banking
system for the cyclical effects of reforms, we consider the baseline model under two different
pre-reform steady-state shares of i firms. First, we consider a pre-reform share of 0.17 (low
pre-reform equilibrium), which is the lowest share observed in the EME sample in Table 1.
Second, we consider a pre-reform share of 0.56 (high pre-reform equilibrium), which is the
share in our sample of AEs (as well as the highest share observed in the sample of EMEs in
Table 1). The results for these two cases are presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. This
experiment maintains the same calibration targets as those used in our baseline calibration,
except for the target pertaining to the pre-reform share of i firms.33 Of note, keeping the
31Recall that, in the long run, banking reforms, regardless of whether they foster bank competition or
household participation, lead to positive macro outcomes.
32In contrast, a more advanced economy—as reflected in a larger share of i household members and lower
bank net interest margins—generates a relative volatility of consumption smaller than 1 and an acyclical
trade balance-output ratio relative to the baseline (EME) economy, which is consistent with key stylized
facts regarding business cycles in AEs as well.
33We use αy to hit this target, but using other plausible parameters delivers the same conclusions. Note
that while the sunk entry cost is another natural parameter that can generate variation in the share of i
firms, our experiments under changes in sunk entry costs would then involve joint goods-markets and banking
reforms. Given our sole focus on banking reforms, we consider αy—ultimately a technological parameter
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same parameter values from our baseline calibration (except, of course, for the parameter
that yields the pre-reform share of i firms) does not change any of our main conclusions.
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Figure 3: Cyclical Dynamics and Banking Reform Equilibria, Baseline i-Firm Share = 0.17
within the confines of our framework—to be a more natural choice.
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Figure 4: Cyclical Dynamics and Banking Reform Equilibria, Baseline i-Firm Share = 0.56
First, we note that comparison of Figures 2 through 4 shows that the higher is the
pre-reform share of i firms, the lower is the volatility of output and unemployment in the
pre-reform economy (that is, in the economy with lower λ and high net interest margins). To
the extent that a higher pre-reform Ni/N reflects a more developed economy (with greater
firm participation in the banking system, per Table 1), this is empirically-consistent with
more developed economies exhibiting smoother business cycles.
Second, in the low pre-reform equilibrium (Figure 3), the volatility of output, consump-
tion, and unemployment is always increasing in household participation and bank compe-
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tition. In addition, the countercyclicality of the trade balance is decreasing in household
participation, while it is U-shaped in bank competition. In contrast, in the high pre-reform
equilibrium (Figure 4), the volatility of output, consumption, and unemployment is always
decreasing in household participation and bank competition, while the countercyclicality of
the trade balance is always decreasing.
Finally, the greater is the pre-reform share of i firms, the greater is the change in the
cyclicality of the trade balance-output ratio in response to reforms. Of note, a model with
two households (financially-excluded and -included) but a single (financially-included) firm
category which, incidentally, implies that all firms participate in the banking system, shows
that both individual and comprehensive banking reforms unambiguously reduce labor market
and aggregate volatility. This is consistent with existing findings in one-household, one-firm
models for AEs (see, for example, Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs, 2015). These results
highlight the importance of not only accounting for different firm categories, but also their
relative participation rates in the domestic banking system for the analysis of banking reform
in EMEs, especially when the latter exhibit low levels of firm and household participation.
Importantly, comparison of Figures 2, 3, and 4 reveals an important finding regarding
the impact of banking reforms on cyclical dynamics: there is a threshold in the pre-reform
share of i firms above which banking reform, regardless of whether it is manifested in greater
household participation or more bank competition, leads to lower output and consumption
volatility, even if the economy starts off with a low level of household participation λ (under
this scenario, investment and wage volatility follow the same pattern as output volatility;
that is, they are decreasing under both individual and comprehensive reforms). This holds
for unemployment volatility as well where, for a high-enough pre-reform Ni/N , an increase
in λ actually leads to reductions in unemployment volatility.
While for expositional purposes we show the results for three different pre-reform shares of
i firms for illustrative purposes, this threshold is somewhat different depending on whether we
look at output volatility or unemployment volatility. Specifically, the threshold for the pre-
reform share of i firms above which comprehensive reforms that bring our representative EME
to AE levels lead to lower output volatility occurs roughly around 0.27 under our baseline
calibration (note that this is slightly above the empirical mean i-firm share in EMEs; see
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Table 1). In turn, the threshold for the pre-reform share of i firms above which comprehensive
reforms that bring our representative EME to AE levels lead to lower unemployment volatility
occurs roughly around 0.30.34
Economic Intuition and Mechanisms An individual reform that increases λ implies
that a larger segment of the economy—workers and household members, but also firms since
households are the ultimate owners of firms—is vulnerable to interest rate shocks. The ex-
pansion in the share of i individuals leads to a large change in the steady-state composition of
total consumption, the total number of firms, and total (un)employment, with ui accounting
for the bulk of total unemployment post-reform (Table 2). The increase (decrease) in steady-
state i-household (e-household) consumption makes i-households’ consumption less sensitive
to shocks, but exacerbates the sensitivity of e-households’ consumption to exogenous dis-
turbances. In turn, this generates contrasting changes in the two households’ valuation of
the future via distinct movements in their stochastic discount factors.35 This mechanism
stabilizes the expected marginal benefit of creating vacancies and accumulating capital by
intermediate-goods i firms such that hiring and investment decisions, as well as the creation
of i firms, become less sensitive to shocks. Of note, despite the reduction in i-category un-
employment volatility, the sharp rise in steady-state ui/u is such that total unemployment
volatility increases.36
The opposite takes place among e firms since e households’ lower steady-state income
and consumption post-reform make their consumption decisions more sensitive, leading to
more volatile hiring, investment, and firm creation decisions. This is ultimately reflected
in more volatile e-category consumption and output. Importantly, this greater e-category
volatility more than offsets the reduction in i-households’ volatility, thereby leading to a
34Details available upon request.
35Formally, consider log-linear versions of each household category’s stochastic discount factor: Ξ̂j
t+1|t =
u′(cj) [û
′(cj,t+1)− û
′(cj,t)]
(
Ξj
)−1
for j ∈ {e, i}, where hatted terms denote log deviations from steady-state.
Consider household i, who experiences higher steady-state ci post-reform, implying that u
′(ci) is lower post-
reform. Then, for a given deviation in ci from steady-state, Ξ̂
i
t+1|t becomes less sensitive post-reform.
36To understand this result formally, consider a log-linear version of total unemployment: ût = (ui/u)ûi,t+
(ue/u)ûe,t, where hatted terms denote log deviations from steady-state and variables without time subscripts
denote steady-state variables. Then, for a given variability of ui,t, the sharp rise in (ui/u) is such that i-
category unemployment will put upward pressure on the volatility of total unemployment.
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sharper response in the post-reform economy. All told, despite the fact that the contribution
of e firms and households to firms, employment, and economic activity is smaller post-reform,
their more sensitive response to shocks more than offsets the gains in lower volatility among
i firms and households and leads to higher unemployment and aggregate volatility.
A similar rationale applies to the behavior of i firms and households holds under an
individual reform that bolsters bank competition. However, in contrast to the individual
reform that increases λ, the change in the steady-state composition of total consumption
and firms amid lower net interest margins is small. Moreover, the increase in bank competi-
tion boosts steady-state consumption across both household categories and the steady-state
number of both e and i firms. Thus, firms’ and households’ decisions become less sensitive to
shocks across the board, thereby leading to smoother labor market and aggregate dynamics
(especially amid interest rate shocks) post-reform.
Figures 5 and 6 shed light on these effects by showing impulse responses to temporary
adverse aggregate productivity and interest rate shocks, respectively, for the the different
reform equilibria (all pertinent quantities are expressed in data-consistent terms).37 For the
same productivity shock across reform equilibria, reforms seem to have limited effects on the
aggregate responses to these shocks. Importantly, though, this is not the case under foreign
interest rate shocks, suggesting that these shocks are important in the analysis of banking re-
forms in EMEs. Indeed, Figure 6 shows how greater bank competition contributes to lowering
labor market and aggregate volatility in response to interest rate shocks. It also shows how
such reform can offset the adverse cyclical effects of a reform-driven increase in λ. Of note, a
reform-driven increase in λ expands the share of individuals who are exposed to interest rate
shocks and leads to sharper fluctuations relative to the baseline economy.38 All told, the op-
posing forces between individual banking reforms described above—with a higher λ making
37Of note, the baseline economy generates factual dynamics in response to adverse aggregate productiv-
ity and interest rate shocks: temporarily lower output, consumption, investment, and wages, and higher
unemployment.
38The fact that having a larger share of financially-included households leads to a sharper output and
unemployment response to financial shocks is consistent with the empirical and theoretical findings in Epstein,
Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017b) in the context of global financial risk shocks. As shown
in their work, the empirical response of unemployment to global financial risk shocks in economies with a
larger share of financially-included households is stronger, and within a theoretical context, this share can
rationalize the differential response to these shocks in AEs relative to EMEs.
30
the economy more sensitive to shocks and a higher H stabilizing aggregate fluctuations—
explain why comprehensive reform ultimately has very limited volatility-reducing effects on
aggregate dynamics, and in the case of unemployment volatility, adverse effects if the share
of firms benefiting from the reforms is small enough.
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Figure 5: Response to a One Standard Deviation Reduction in Aggregate Productivity
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Figure 6: Response to a One Standard Deviation Increase in Foreign Interest Rates
Turning to the importance of firm participation, Figures 2, 3, and 4 above illustrated how
a high-enough pre-reform share of firm participation implies that reforms have unambiguous
volatility-reducing effects in the labor market and the economy as a whole. To understand the
role of this share, note that there is a positive relationship between the initial share of i firms
pre-reform and these firms’ contribution to total output. Moreover, the model suggests a
disproportionate contribution by i firms to total output relative to their share in the universe
of firms. Specifically, an economy with a baseline share of i firms of alternatively 0.17, 0.26,
and 0.56 has a contribution to total output by i firms of 0.331, 0.459, and 0.754, respectively.39
39This result is independent of the specific parameter we use to match the pre-reform share of i firms in
the model.
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These results are broadly consistent with evidence on the distribution of firms by firm size
(with firms with access to bank credit being on average larger) and their contribution to total
value added (see, for example, OECD, 2013). Furthermore, these findings shed light on why
banking reforms reduce labor market and aggregate volatility for high-enough pre-reform
levels of firm participation in the banking system: since these reforms have unambiguous
volatility-reducing effects among i firms’ and households’ decisions, the larger is these firms’
contribution to total output, the more stabilizing these reforms are. More importantly, as the
share of i-firm output becomes increasing larger, greater household participation becomes less
destabilizing (and for high enough levels, individual reforms boosting household participation
have virtually no negative effects on volatility). This is apparent from Figures A10 and A11
in the Appendix, which show the response to productivity and interest rate shocks of an
economy with a pre-reform share of i firms of 0.56 (as in AEs).
Finally, we note that while data on the contribution to GDP by firms without access to
credit is generally not available, the size of the informal sector (as a share of GDP) can be
used as a reasonable proxy. Then, our model-based implication is consistent with the well-
known negative relationship between the level of economic development (which is associated
with a more developed and more competitive banking system and more household and firm
participation) and the size of the informal sector.
4.3 Transitional Dynamics and Welfare
We briefly discuss how transition paths post-reform differ across individual and compre-
hensive reforms (all relevant details are summarized in Figures A14, A15, and A16 in the
Appendix). Given the large changes in λ and net interest margins we consider, we consider a
gradual (and hence more plausible) and permanent increase in the level of bank competition
H alone, in the level of household participation λ alone, and in both λ and H , that spans
roughly 2.5 years. For illustrative purposes, the change we consider for λ (from 0.42 to 0.62)
is consistent with the average change in household participation from 2011 to 2014 (the dates
for which data from the Global Financial Inclusion Database on the share of individuals with
an account at financial institutions is available) in our sample of EMEs.
The post-reform transition is such that consumption is temporarily lower before rising
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above the pre-reform steady-state and eventually converging to a permanently higher level.
This occurs despite the slow but persistent rise in output and is driven by the fact that i
households cut back on consumption to channel resources towards the creation of i firms
in response to the reforms. At the same time, the trade balance temporarily deteriorates
relative to its pre-reform level as households acquire foreign debt to also finance the creation
of firms. In the long run, output, consumption, investment, and the trade balance-output
ratio are all higher, while unemployment is lower. Importantly, the short-run cost reflected
in a temporary contraction in consumption post-reform is decreasing in the pre-reform share
of i firms. In fact, for a pre-reform share of 0.56, consumption does not fall and instead
gradually rises in response to the reforms. In contrast, for a pre-reform share of 0.17, the
temporary contraction in consumption after the implementation of reforms is considerably
more long-lived relative to the scenario under the benchmark calibration (see Figures A17
and A18 in the Appendix).40 Once again, this highlights the importance of considering
firms’ level of participation when characterizing the business cycle consequences of banking
reforms, but also the transition path post-reform.
For completeness, Table A2 presents the long- and short-term impact of individual re-
forms on e and i households. While i households unambiguously benefit from individual
reforms, e households are adversely affected by reforms that bolster household participation
but benefit from greater bank competition.41 Of note, the welfare gains for e households
amid greater bank competition are increasing in the pre-reform share of i firms.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The Appendix presents results for: (1) alternative assumptions regarding firm ownership
(Section A.7 of the Appendix), (2) different values for the elasticity of substitution between
sectoral output (Section A.5 of the Appendix) and, importantly, (3) sectoral differences
in vacancy posting costs, employment separation probabilities, and capital shares (Section
A.6 of the Appendix), among others. Our main conclusions remain unchanged under these
40Moreover, unemployment actually rises temporarily before slowly following a downward path.
41This is consistent with the results in Table 2, where e households’ consumption falls (rises) under greater
household participation (bank competition).
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alternative assumptions and calibrations. In addition, we note that assuming that banks
choose the interest rate on loans instead of extracting the entirety of i firms’ profits (a
baseline assumption in line with Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs, 2015), or that both
entry costs and investment among i firms are financed with bank credit, does not change
any of our conclusions.42
Finally, as noted earlier, Section A.9 of the Appendix presents the details of a richer
version of our model where members from each household category can search for employment
across firm categories and not just within their own category. Figures A12 and A13 confirm
that the importance of the degree of firm participation for the volatility-reducing effects
of banking reforms continues to hold under this richer environment. All told, our main
conclusions are robust to alternative assumptions and, importantly, richer specifications of
the labor market.
5 Conclusion
Developing and emerging economies (EMEs) differ considerably in the level of bank com-
petition and firm and household participation in the banking system relative to advanced
economies (AEs). We study the labor market and business cycle implications of banking
reforms using a framework with endogenous firm entry and a monopolistically-competitive
banking sector, labor market frictions, and empirically-factual household and firm hetero-
geneity in banking system participation. Calibrating the model to a representative EME
amid aggregate productivity and foreign interest rate shocks, we consider banking reforms
that bring the banking system closer to AE standards via: (1) a higher share of financially-
included households; (2) increased bank competition (via a larger number of banks and
lower net interest margins); and (3) a joint improvement in both (1) and (2) that embodies
comprehensive banking reform.
Three key messages emerge from our work. First, while reforms unambiguously lead to
better long-term macroeconomic outcomes, economies that begin reforms amid low levels
of bank competition and both low firm and household participation in the banking system
42Details and results available upon request.
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exhibit higher post-reform labor market and business cycle volatility as they incorporate
more individuals into the banking system. However, improvements in banking competition
can limit the adverse effect of greater household participation on aggregate fluctuations,
but their smoothing effect is limited amid low pre-reform firm participation in the banking
system, as is the case in many EMEs. Second, the extent to which reforms bring about
reductions in business cycle volatility depends crucially on the pre-reform share of firm
participation: there is a critical threshold in the pre-reform share above (below) which
reforms unambiguously smooth (increase) labor market and aggregate fluctuations. Third,
the transition towards long-run post-reform equilibria starting from an EME scenario can
entail short-term reductions in consumption and a deterioration in the trade balance, which
arise to support the creation of firms that participate in the banking system. However, this
cost is decreasing in the pre-reform share of firms that participate in the banking system,
and this cost eventually disappears for high-enough pre-reform levels of firm participation.
More broadly, our work identifies critical features that shape the short- and medium-term
effects of banking reforms in EMEs vis--vis similar reforms in AEs. Our work abstracted from
the financial stability consequences of banking reforms, as well as the political feasibility of
welfare-improving reforms that entail non-negligible short-term adjustment costs. We plan
to explore these and other relevant issues in future work.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Data Sources and Details: Table 1 and Figure 1
Table 1 and Figure 1 are based on data from 2000 to 2011 from the World Bank Global
Financial Development Report 2014 (share of the population with accounts at financial
institutions (% of population age 15+) in 2011), the IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database
2010 (share of firms with credit line; share of informal and formal firms, share of formal and
informal firms with bank loans), the World Bank Financial Development Structure Database
2011 (net interest margins, Lerner Index).
Regarding Table 1: The sample of AEs with data on firms with bank loans is comprised
of: Austria, Belgium, Finland, and The Netherlands based on data availability. The AE
country sample for the remaining measures is comprised of: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom (data for some countries may not be available for particu-
lar variables). Similar facts hold if we restrict the sample to those countries with data on firms
with bank loans only. The EME country sample is comprised of: Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
Data on the share of firms with bank loans from the SAFE and the IFC databases is not
strictly comparable: the above evidence is only meant to illustrate the disparities in firms’
access to bank finance in the two country groups. The share of firms with a loan in AEs
is based on semi-annual data for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and encompasses
bank loans or bank overdrafts, averaged over 2011 (for related evidence on firms’ reliance
on bank loans in Europe, see Hoffmann and Sorensen, 2015). The share of firms with bank
loans is computed as follows: first, firms are categorized as formal if they are micro (1-4
employees), very small (5-9 employees), small (10-49 employees), and medium (50-250 em-
ployees) enterprises registered with their local government or tax authorities. Informal firms
are not registered with tax authorities and includes one-person firms regardless of whether
these are registered (see https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-sites/ifc-enterprise-finance-
gap for more details). The share of formal firms in AEs is roughly 69 percent, and 76 percent
41
of them have bank loans. The share of formal firms in EMEs is roughly 27 percent, and only
55 percent of them have bank loans. In turn, only 11 percent of the remaining (informal)
firms have bank loans. All told, the total share of firms with bank loans in each group is
obtained by adding the shares of formal and informal firms with bank loans, assuming that
the share of informal firms with bank loans is similar in the two country groups absent data
for AEs. The Lerner Index is a measure of the degree of competition in the banking system,
with a higher index being associated with a less competitive banking system (see the World
Bank Global Financial Development Report for more details). The number of commercial
bank branches represents a demographic measure of bank penetration.
List of countries in Figure 1: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equa-
torial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myan-
mar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pak-
istan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. Data availability and coverage for each variable
presented in Figure 1 varies by country.
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A.2 Aggregation in Benchmark Model
To determine the equilibrium real relative price for each monopolistically-competitive whole-
sale firm category j ∈ {e, i}, consider
Pj,t =
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
pj,t(ωj)
1−εdωj
) 1
1−ε
.
Dividing both sides by Pt, we have
Pj,t
Pt
=
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
(
pj,t(ωj)
Pt
)1−ε
dωj
) 1
1−ε
,
Imposing symmetry, we have
Pj,t
Pt
=
pj,t
Pt
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
1dωj
) 1
1−ε
,
where we can define pj,t/Pt ≡ ρj,t. Then, since there are Nj,t wholesale firms operating in
firm category j in period t, the above expression becomes
Pj,t
Pt
= ρj,tN
1
1−ε
j,t ,
which can be rewritten as
ρj,t =
Pj,t
Pt
N
1
ε−1
j,t .
Similarly, recall that wholesale output at sectoral level is given by Yj,t =
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
yj,t(ωj)
ε−1
ε dωj
) ε
ε−1
.
Imposing symmetry, we have
Yj,t = yj,t
(∫
ωj∈Ωj
1dωj
) ε
ε−1
,
Then, since there are Nj,t wholesale firms operating in firm category j in period t, the above
expression becomes
Yj,t = yj,tN
ε
ε−1
j,t .
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A.3 Equilibrium Conditions: Benchmark Model
Taking the stochastic processes {zt, zr,t} as given, the allocations and prices {Yt, mci,t, mce,t} ,
{NE,et, NE,it, Qt, ni,t, ne,t, ki,t, ke,t, vi,t, ve,t, wi,t, we,t, bt, b
∗
t , eb,t, ee,t, ρi,t, ρe,t, Yi,t, Ye,t, ci,t, ce,t, Pi,t, Pe,t, Pt}
satisfy:
Yt =
[
(1− αy)
1
φy (Yi,t)
φy−1
φy + α
1
φy
y (Ye,t)
φy−1
φy
] φy
φy−1
, (20)
ρi,t = (ε/(ε− 1))mci,t, (21)
ρe,t = (ε/(ε− 1))mce,t, (22)
ee,t = ψe,t, (23)
Qt =
(
1
1− δ
)
ψi,t, (24)
Qt = EtΞt+1|t
{(
1−
1
H
)
di,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
}
, (25)
ni,t+1 = (1− ρ
n
i ) (ni,t + vi,tq(θi,t)) , (26)
ne,t+1 = (1− ρ
n
e ) (ne,t + ve,tq(θe,t)) , (27)
1 = EtΞt+1|t
{
1 + αmci,t+1zi,t+1n
1−α
i,t+1k
a−1
i,t+1 − δ
}
, (28)
1 = EtΞt+1|t
{
1 + αmce,t+1ze,t+1n
1−α
e,t+1k
a−1
e,t+1 − δ
}
, (29)
κi
q(θi,t)
= (1− ρni )EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
(1− α)mci,t+1zi,t+1n
−α
i,t+1k
a
i,t+1 − wi,t+1 +
κi
q(θi,t+1)
}
, (30)
κe
q(θe,t)
= (1− ρne )EtΞ
e
t+1|t
{
(1− α)mce,t+1ze,t+1n
−α
e,t+1k
a
e,t+1 − we,t+1 +
κe
q(θe,t+1)
}
, (31)
wi,t = η
[
(1− α)mci,tzi,tn
−α
i,t k
a
i,t + κiθi,t
]
+ (1− η)χ, (32)
we,t = η
[
(1− α)mce,tze,tn
−α
e,t k
a
e,t + κeθe,t
]
+ (1− η)χ, (33)
u′(ci,t) = Rt+1βEtu
′(ci,t+1), (34)
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1 = R∗t+1βEt
u′(ci,t+1)
u′(ci,t)
+ ηbb
∗
t+1, (35)
eb,t = EtΞ
i
t+1|t {pib,t+1 + eb,t+1} , (36)
ee,t = (1− δ)EtΞ
e
t+1|t {de,t+1 + ee,t+1} , (37)
ρi,t =
Pi,t
Pt
N
1
ε−1
i,t , (38)
ρe,t =
Pe,t
Pt
N
1
ε−1
e,t , (39)
ce,t + xe,t+1NE,etee,t = we,tne,t + χeue,t + xe,tNe,t [de,t + ee,t] + Πe,t, (40)
Yi,t = N
ε
ε−1
i,t yi,t = N
1
ε−1
i,t zi,tn
1−α
i,t k
a
i,t, (41)
Ye,t = N
ε
ε−1
e,t ye,t = N
1
ε−1
e,t ze,tn
1−α
e,t k
a
e,t, (42)
Yt = ce,t+ ci,t+ ie,t+ ii,t+κeve,t+κivi,t+ψe,tNE,et+ψi,tNE,it+R
∗
t b
∗
t − b
∗
t+1+
ηb
2
(b∗t+1)
2, (43)
Pi,t/Pt = (1− αy)
1
φy (Yt/Yi,t)
1
φy , (44)
Pe,t/Pt = α
1
φy
y (Yt/Ye,t)
1
φy , (45)
Pt =
[
(1− αy) (Pi,t)
1−φy + αy (Pe,t)
1−φy
] 1
φy−1
, (46)
given the definitions of the stochastic discount factors, the matching probabilities, and
total unemployment, ut = 1− ne,t − ni,t.
A.4 Baseline Economy under Different Baseline Steady-State i-
Firm Shares
In what follows, we present the calibration details for versions of the baseline EME under
different steady-state i firm shares.
Baseline Economy with Steady-State Ni/N = 0.17 We adopt the same calibration
targets as the baseline economy in the main text, except for the share of i firms in the
economy, which we now change to 0.17 (vs. 0.26 in the main text). We continue to assume
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that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated parameters are: ξ =
0.3789, κ = 0.0629, ψe = 0.4177, ψi = 0.5926, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9923, and b = 0.0016.
Baseline Economy with Steady-State Ni/N = 0.56 We adopt the same calibration
targets as the baseline economy in the main text, except for the share of i firms in the
economy, which we now change to 0.56 (vs. 0.26 in the main text). We continue to assume
that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated parameters are: ξ =
0.4136, κ = 0.1523, ψe = 1.0153, ψi = 1.4362, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.4030, and b = 0.0008.
A.5 Robustness Checks: Alternative Parameterizations
Benchmark Model with φy = 1.5 Relative to the baseline calibration in the main text
(φy = 5), we assume that φy = 1.5. We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx =
0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of
the baseline EME economy are: ξ = 0.3858, κ = 0.1118, ψe = 0.7432, ψi = 1.0546, H =
2.4290, αy = 0.6359, and ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A1: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria (φy = 1.5)
Benchmark Model with φy = 3 Relative to the baseline calibration in the main text
(φy = 5), we assume that φy = 3. We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx =
0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of
the baseline EME economy are: ξ = 0.3824, κ = 0.0931, ψe = 0.6184, ψi = 0.8775, H =
2.4290, αy = 0.8499, and ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A2: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria (φy = 3)
A.6 Robustness Checks: Asymmetries Across Firm Categories
Firm-Category Vacancy-Cost Differences Relative to the baseline calibration in the
main text, we assume that the cost of posting vacancies for e firms represents 50 percent
of the cost faced by i firms (this can reflect, among other things, the fact that smaller
firms in EMEs often circumvent labor market regulations, thereby leading to lower hiring
costs). We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting
calibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of the baseline EME economy are:
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ξ = 0.3607, κe = 0.0407, κi = 0.0814, ψe = 0.5406, ψi = 0.7673, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9635, and
ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A3: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria (κe < κi)
Firm-Category Capital Share Differences Relative to the baseline calibration in the
main text, we assume that e firms are less capital intensive relative to i firms. This assump-
tion is consistent with the fact that smaller firms in EMEs, which are less likely to have access
to bank credit, are less capital intensive. Specifically, we assume a capital share of 0.27 for e
firms (vs. 0.32 for i firms). We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr.
The resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of the baseline EME
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economy are: ξ = 0.3812, κ = 0.0595, ψe = 0.4021, ψi = 0.5614, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9863,
and ηb = 0.0013. The results below become even stronger for larger differences in capital
shares between i and e firms.
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Figure A4: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, Lower Capital Share
Among e Firms
Firm-Category Differences in Separation Probabilities Relative to the baseline cal-
ibration in the main text, we assume that e firms face higher employment separation prob-
abilities relative to i firms (this assumption is consistent with the fact that smaller firms,
which are more likely to be informal, face higher separation probabilities (see, for exam-
50
ple, Bosch and Maloney, 2008)). Specifically, we assume that ρne = 0.08 and ρ
n
i = 0.05.
We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting cal-
ibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of the baseline EME economy are:
ξ = 0.5381, κ = 0.0802, ψe = 0.5341, ψi = 0.7557, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9682, and ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A5: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, Different Employment
Separation Probabilities
Identical Sunk Entry Costs Across Firms Relative to the baseline calibration in the
main text, we assume all wholesale firms face the same sunk entry cost. Specifically, we
assume that ψe = ψi = ψ. We continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr.
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The resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative calibration of the baseline EME
economy are: ξ = 0.3837, κ = 0.0654, ψ = 0.6168, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9899, and ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A6: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, Identical Sunk Entry
Costs Across Firms
A.7 Banking Reforms: Alternative Firm-Ownership Assumptions
Benchmark Model, i Households Own All Firms This version of the model assumes
that all firms are owned by i households, implying that e households’ sole source of income
comes from labor income via employment in e firms. We assume the same calibration targets
used in the main text. and continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The
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resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative version of the baseline EME economy
are: ξ = 0.3809, κ = 0.0811, ψe = 0.5387, ψi = 0.7643, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9645, and
ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A7: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, i Households Own All
Firms
Benchmark Model, i Households Own Wholesale e Firms This version of the model
assumes that wholesale e firms are owned by i households, implying that e households’ sources
of income come from labor income via employment in e firms and ownership of intermediate-
goods e firms. We assume the same calibration targets used in the main text. and continue
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to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated parameters
under this alternative version of the baseline EME economy are: ξ = 0.3809, κ = 0.0811, ψe =
0.5387, ψi = 0.7643, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9645, and ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A8: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, i Households Own
Wholesale e Firms
Benchmark Model, i Households Own Intermediate-Goods e Firms This version
of the model assumes that intermediate-goods e firms are owned by i households, implying
that e households’ sources of income come from labor income via employment in e firms
and ownership of wholesale e firms. We assume the same calibration targets used in the
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main text. and continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The
resulting calibrated parameters under this alternative version of the baseline EME economy
are: ξ = 0.3809, κ = 0.0811, ψe = 0.5387, ψi = 0.7643, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9645, and
ηb = 0.0013.
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Figure A9: Business Cycle Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria, i Households Own
Intermediate-Goods e Firms
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A.8 Banking Reforms: Steady State and Impulse Response Func-
tions, Baseline Economy with Ni/N = 0.56
Table A1 below compares our main results for the baseline economy with a pre-reform i-
firm share of 0.26 and the same economy under a comprehensive banking reform (which
were presented in Table 3 in the main text) to an otherwise identically-calibrated baseline
economy with a pre-reform i-firm share of 0.56 and the corresponding economy under a
comprehensive banking reform.
Table A1: Steady State Under Different Banking Reform Equilibria - Baseline and High Ni Share
Variable Baseline (EME) Baseline Baseline (EME) Baseline
Economy, Ni/N = 0.26 Economy, Ni/N = 0.56
Ni/N = 0.26 Higher λ and H Ni/N = 0.56 Higher λ and H
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yd 4.143 7.996 7.859 16.38
cd 2.863 5.451 5.567 11.39
cd,i 1.317 5.240 4.397 11.29
cd,e 1.546 0.211 1.170 0.105
invd 0.687 1.325 1.302 2.715
N 45.74 54.77 28.83 99.41
Ni 11.89 51.71 17.30 98.04
Ne 33.84 3.064 11.53 1.367
Ni/N 0.260 0.944 0.600 0.986
wd,i 2.530 4.479 8.193 9.459
wd,e 2.161 4.270 1.645 2.129
Labor Incomed,i 0.977 3.961 3.203 8.483
Labor Incomed,e 1.150 0.157 0.867 0.078
ni 0.386 0.885 0.391 0.897
ne 0.532 0.037 0.527 0.037
ui/u 0.414 0.960 0.355 0.951
ue/u 0.586 0.040 0.645 0.049
u 0.082 0.079 0.082 0.067
H 2.429 20.60 2.429 20.60
λ 0.420 0.960 0.420 0.960
∆ Net Int. Margin 0 −2.61 0 −2.61
(Percentage Points)
The figures below show the response to adverse aggregate productivity and interest rate
shocks for a version of the baseline economy with a share of i firms of 0.56 under the different
reform equilibria considered in Table 3 of the main text.
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Figure A10: Response to a One Standard Deviation Reduction in Aggregate Productivity –
Higher Baseline Ni/N Share
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Figure A11: Response to a One Standard Deviation Increase in Foreign Interest Rates –
Higher Baseline Ni/N Share
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A.9 Household Search for Employment Across Firm Categories
Our baseline model assumes that household members in one category can only work in an
intermediate-goods firm within their own category. This implies that the labor market is
essentially a segmented one. This section describes an extension of the model in the main
text where households in a given category can send its unemployed individuals to search
for employment across intermediate-goods-firm categories (both e and i). We note that the
final goods’, wholesale aggregator, and wholesale firms’ problems remain unchanged since
these firms do not face search and matching frictions. Among other things, this implies that
the decision over entry by wholesale firms remains unchanged. As such, we only describe
the modifications we make relative to the baseline model in the main text when we allow
for directed job search across firm categories by the two household categories. This richer
structure follows the Appendix in Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017),
who present a similar modification to their baseline model in a context with banking frictions.
Matching Processes This modification implies that the matching functions becomem(uii,t+
uei,t, vi,t) = (u
i
i,t+u
e
i,t)vi,t/((u
i
i,t+u
e
i,t)
ξ+vξi,t)
1/ξ and m(uee,t+u
i
e,t, ve,t) = (u
e
e,t+u
i
e,t)ve,t/((u
e
e,t+
uie,t)
ξ+vξe,t)
1/ξ where ξ > 0, ve,t and vi,t denote vacancies posted by e and i intermediate-goods
firms, respectively, and uee,t (u
i
i,t) denote unemployed searchers from e (i) households searching
for employment in e (i) intermediate-goods firms. In turn, uie,t denotes unemployed searchers
from e households searching for employment in i firms, whereas uei,t denotes unemployed
searchers from i households searching for employment in e firms. Both matching functions
are constant-returns-to-scale (Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson, 2000).43 Given these match-
ing functions, the job-finding and job-filling probabilities in firm category e are defined as
f(θe,t) = fe,t = ve,t/((u
e
e,t+u
i
e,t)
ξ+vξe,t)
1/ξ and q(θe,t) = qe,t = (u
e
e,t+u
i
e,t)/((u
e
e,t+u
i
e,t)
ξ+vξe,t)
1/ξ,
where market tightness θe,t ≡ ve,t/(u
e
e,t+u
i
e,t). Similarly, the job-finding and job-filling prob-
abilities in firm category i are defined as f(θi,t) = fi,t = vi,t/((u
i
i,t + u
e
i,t)
ξ + vξi,t)
1/ξ and
q(θi,t) = qi,t = (u
i
i,t+u
e
i,t)/((u
i
i,t+u
e
i,t)
ξ+vξi,t)
1/ξ, where market tightness θi,t ≡ vi,t/(u
i
i,t+u
e
i,t).
43As noted in the main text, this particular functional form guarantees that matching probabilities are
always bounded between 0 and 1. Our results remain the same if we adopt a Cobb-Douglas matching spec-
ification (the Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson specification allows us to consider a wider range of parameter
values in our quantitative experiments).
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In what follows, total i-firm employment is given by ni,t ≡ n
i
i,t + n
e
i,t, where n
i
i,t (n
e
i,t)
denotes i-firm employment supplied by i (e) households. Similarly, total e-firm employment
is given by ne,t ≡ n
e
e,t + n
i
e,t, where n
e
e,t (n
i
e,t) denotes e-firm employment supplied by e (i)
households.
Intermediate Goods Firms Intermediate-goods firms in category j ∈ {e, i} are per-
fectly competitive and act as suppliers to wholesale firms in their respective category. For
simplicity, we continue to assume that intermediate-goods firms in one category cannot act
as suppliers to wholesale firms in the other category. This does not change our main con-
clusions. Intermediate-goods firms produce using internally-accumulated capital and labor,
where labor is subject to standard search and matching frictions.
Relative to the baseline model in the main text, intermediate goods firms in each cate-
gory j now employ workers from both household categories (e and i) instead of only hiring
individuals from households within their own category.
Intermediate-goods firms in category j = e, i choose capital accumulation kj,t+1, vacancies
vj,t, and desired employment n
j
j,t+1 and n
h
j,t+1 where h = e, i and h 6= j. They do so in order
to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 Ξ
j
t|0Πj,t subject to the definition of firm profits
Πj,t = mmcj,tzj,tF (n
j
j,t, n
h
j,t, k j,t)− w
j
j,tn
j
j,t − w
h
j,tn
h
j,t − κjvj,t − ij,t,
the evolution of capital44
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + ij,t, (47)
and the perceived evolution of each type of employment
njj,t+1 = (1− ρ
j)
[
njj,t + ω
n
j,tvj,tqj,t
]
, (48)
and
nhj,t+1 = (1− ρ
j)
[
nhj,t + (1− ω
n
j,t)vj,tqj,t
]
, (49)
44Similar to the model in the main text, we include standard capital adjustment costs as part of our
quantitative analysis.
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where mcj,t is the real price of intermediate goods, κj is the flow cost of posting a vacancy,
and ρnj is the exogenous separation probability in category j. The production function
F (njj, n
h
j , k j) is constant-returns-to-scale and is increasing in labor and capital. We allow
njj and n
h
j to be imperfect substitutes. zj,t is exogenous category-specific productivity and
follows a stochastic process. Similar to Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez
(2017), ωnj,t = u
j
j,t/(u
j
j,t+u
h
j,t), where u
j
j,t is the measure of household j searchers for employ-
ment in j firms and uhj,t is the measure of household h searchers for employment in j firms,
where j = e, i and h = e, i and h 6= j.
The firm’s first-order conditions deliver a standard capital Euler equation
1 = EtΞ
j
t+1|t
[
mcj,t+1zj,t+1Fkj ,t+1 + 1− δ
]
, (50)
and a job creation condition
ζ ′(vj,t)
qj,t
= (1− ρj)EtΞ
j
t+1|t
{
ωnj,tJ
j
j,t+1 + (1− ω
n
j,t)J
h
j,t+1
}
, (51)
for each firm category j = e, i where h = e, i and h 6= j. Above, Jjj,t (J
h
j,t) denote firm j’s
value from having an additional worker from household j (h). More specifically,
Jjj,t = mcj,tzj,tFnjj ,t
− wjj,t + (1− ρ
j)EtΞ
j
t+1|tJ
j
j,t+1,
and
Jhj,t = mcj,tzj,tFnhj ,t − w
h
j,t + (1− ρ
j)EtΞ
j
t+1|tJ
h
j,t+1.
The general intuition for these expressions is identical to the one in the main text. Specif-
ically, the expected marginal benefit of posting a vacancy by firm j is given by a weighted
average of the values of having a worker from each household category (where the weight is
given by the proportion of searchers from a given household).
Financially-Included (i) Households This section is similar (in structure and nota-
tion) to the richer household environment presented in the Appendix of Epstein, Finkelstein
Shapiro, and Gonza´lez Go´mez (2017).
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Similar to the model in the main text, i households have a measure 0 < φn < 1 of
household members. These households choose consumption ci,t, bank deposits bt+1, foreign
debt holdings b∗t+1, and the ownership shares in banks xb,t+1(h) to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ci,t)
subject to the budget constraint:
ci,t + bt+1 + xb,t+1
∑
h∈H
eb,t(h) +R
∗
t b
∗
t +
ηb
2
(b∗t+1)
2 = Rtbt + b
∗
t+1 + w
i
i,tn
i
i,t + w
i
e,tn
i
e,t (52)
+χiui,t + xb,t
∑
h∈H
[pib,t(h) + eb,t(h)] + Πi,t,
where R∗t is the gross real foreign interest rate, eb,t(h) is the price of of a claim to bank h’s
profits pib,t(h), and Πi,t are profits from intermediate-goods i firms. As stated earlier, n
i
i,t and
nie,t are the measures of workers in i households working i and e firms, respectively. w
i
i,t and
wie,t are the associated real wages. With this in mind, unemployment among i household
members is given by ui,t = u
i
i,t + u
i
e,t = λ− n
i
i,t − n
i
e,t.
Households are also subject to the perceived evolution of employment in each firm cate-
gory
nii,t+1 = (1− ρ
i)
[
nii,t + u
i
i,tfi,t
]
,
and
nie,t+1 = (1− ρ
e)
[
nie,t + u
i
e,tfe,t
]
,
where fe,t and fi,t denote the endogenous job-finding probabilities associated with employ-
ment in e and i firms, respectively.
The first-order conditions yield the following standard Euler equations
u′(ci,t) = Rt+1βEtu
′(ci,t+1) and u
′(ci,t) = R
∗
t+1βEtu
′(ci,t+1) (53)
where Ξit+1|t ≡ βu
′(ci,t+1)/u
′(ci,t). The Euler equation for share holdings of banks (after
imposing symmetry) is identical to the one in the main text
eb,t = EtΞ
i
t+1|t [pib,t+1 + eb,t+1] , (54)
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Relative to the model in the main text, i households make optimal decisions over how
to allocate their searchers across firm categories. In particular, define the value of having a
household member search for e-firm employment by
Uie,t = b+ EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
(1− ρe)fe,tW
i
e,t+1 + [1− (1− ρ
e)fe,t]U
i
e,t+1
}
,
and the value of having a household member search for i-firm employment by
Uii,t = b+ EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
(1− ρi)fi,tW
i
i,t+1 + [1− (1− ρ
i)fi,t]U
i
i,t+1
}
,
where Wie,t and Wi, t
i are the values to the household from having an employed member in
firm e and i, respectively. Formally,
Wie,t = w
i
e,t + EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
(1− ρe)Wie,t+1 + ρ
eUie,t+1
}
,
and
Wii,t = w
i
i,t + EtΞ
i
t+1|t
{
(1− ρi)Wii,t+1 + ρ
iUii,t+1
}
.
Households then choose to allocate their unemployed searchers such that, in equilibrium,
Uie,t = U
i
i,t.
Financially-Excluded (e) Households Similar to the model in the main text, e house-
holds have a measure 0 < −phin < 1 of household members.
Households choose consumption ce,t and the ownership shares in household-dependent e
firms xe,t+1 to maximize E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ce,t) subject to the budget constraint:
ce,t + xe,t+1(NE,et +Ne,t)ee,t = w
e
e,tn
e
e,t + w
e
i,tn
e
i,t + χeue,t + xe,tNe,t [de,t + ee,t] + Πe,t, (55)
where ee,t is the price of a claim to wholesale e firms’ profits de,t and Πe,t are profits from
intermediate-goods e firms.
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Households are subject to the perceived evolution of sectoral employment
nee,t+1 = (1− ρ
e)
[
nee,t + u
e
e,tfe,t
]
,
and
nei,t+1 = (1− ρ
i)
[
nei,t + u
e
i,tfi,t
]
,
where uee,t denotes the measure of e-household searchers for employment in e firms, and u
i
e,t
is the corresponding measure of i-household searchers looking for employment in e firms.
Similar to the i households above, fe,t and fi,t denote household e’s job-finding probabilities
for employment in e and i firms. Thus, unemployment among e household members is
ue,t = u
e
e,t + u
e
i,t = (1− λ)− n
e
e,t − n
e
i,t.
The first-order conditions are the same as in the main text and yield the Euler equation
for e firms
ee,t = (1− δ)EtΞ
e
t+1|t [de,t+1 + ee,t+1] , (56)
where Ξet+1|t = βu
′(ce,t+1)/u
′(ce,t).
Similar to the choices of i households, e households can also optimally allocate their
unemployed members between search for employment in e firms or i firms.
The value to an e household from having a household member searching for employment
in e firms is
Uee,t = b+ EtΞ
e
t+1|t
{
(1− ρe)fe,tW
e
e,t+1 + [1− (1− ρ
e)fe,t]U
e
e,t+1
}
,
while the value of having a household member searching for employment in i firms is
Uei,t = b+ EtΞ
e
t+1|t
{
(1− ρi)fi,tW
e
i,t+1 + [1− (1− ρ
i)fi,t]U
e
i,t+1
}
.
Above,Wee,t andW
e
i,t represent the values to the household from having an employed worker
in an e and an i firm, respectively. These values are given by
Wee,t = w
e
e,t + EtΞ
e
t+1|t
{
(1− ρe)Wee,t+1 + ρ
eUee,t+1
}
.
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and
Wei,t = w
e
i,t + EtΞ
e
t+1|t
{
(1− ρi)Wei,t+1 + ρ
iUei,t+1
}
,
It follows that households optimally allocate their unemployed searchers across firm cate-
gories such that, in equilibrium, Uei,t = U
e
e,t
Wage Determination Following the search and matching literature, all wages are de-
termined via bilateral Nash bargaining between firms and workers. Given differences in
stochastic discount factors, no closed-form solutions for the wages can be found. Having
defined the value functions for each side of the market above, the corresponding Nash wages
for i households wii,t, w
i
e,t are given by the following implicit functions:
Wii,t −U
i
i,t =
η
1− η
Jii,t,
and
Wie,t −U
i
e,t =
η
1− η
Jie,t.
Similarly, the corresponding Nash wages for e households and wee,t, w
e
i,t are implicitly given
by:
Wee,t −U
e
e,t =
η
1− η
Jee,t,
and
Wei,t −U
e
i,t =
η
1− η
Jei,t.
Data-Consistent Variables Following the main text, if xm,t is a quantity in the model
expressed in final consumption units, then its empirical (or data) counterpart is given by
xd,t = Ψ
1
1−φy
t xm,t where Ψt = (1 − αy)N
1−φy
1−ε
i,t + αyN
1−φy
1−ε
e,t (see Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and
Ghironi, 2016a).
Calibration and Main Results Except for the production functions of intermediate-
goods firms, all functional forms are the same as in the main text. Specifically, the pro-
duction functions for intermediate-goods e and i firms are given by F (njj,t, n
h
j,t, k j,t) =
65
([
γn
(
njj,t
)ηn
+ (1− γn)
(
nhj,t
)ηn] 1ηn)1−αj
k
αj
j,t where 0 < αj, γn < 1 and ηn < 1 for j = e, i
and h = e, i where j 6= h. We use the same calibration targets as those in the main text, set
ηn = 0.8 as a reasonable baseline that implies labor from the different household categories is
highly substitutable within firm categories, and calibrate γn to match a share of e household
members working in i firms of roughly 17 percent. This is consistent with the average share
of informal employment—a proxy for employed workers from e households—that is employed
outside of the informal sector in EMEs with available ILO data on this metric.
Figure A12 below shows the results from the same policy experiments we conduct in
the main text for the baseline economy with a share of i firms in the economy of 0.26. We
continue to assume that ρx = 0.95 and σx = 0.01 for x = z, zr. The resulting calibrated
parameters are: ξ = 0.425, κ = 0.0637, ψe = 0.4977, ψi = 0.6007, H = 2.4290, αy = 0.9787,
and ηb = 0.0013. Figure A12 shows that our main results remain unchanged in a richer
environment where household members in any given household can search for employment
across firm categories and not just within its own category.
Figure A13 presents the same experiments starting with a baseline share of i firms in the
economy of 0.56, which is closer to a representative AE. Figure A15 similarly shows that our
main results regarding the critical role of the degree of firm participation for determining
the benefits of banking reforms remain unchanged in a richer labor market environment that
allows households to allocate their searchers across firm categories.
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Figure A12: Volatility and Banking Reform Equilibria: Benchmark Model with Full Labor
Mobility, Baseline Ni/N = 0.26
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A.10 Transitional Dynamics and Welfare Effects of Reforms
Transitional Dynamics Figures A14, A15, and A16 show the transitional dynamics of
key labor market and aggregate variables after the gradual implementation of individual
(Figures A14 and A15) and comprehensive banking reforms (Figure A16).
Specifically, we consider a gradual increase in the level of bank competition H alone,
in the level of household participation λ alone, and in both the level of bank competition
H alongside the level of household participation λ, over 2.5 years, after which both H and
68
λ remain at their post-reform levels permanently. For illustrative purposes, the change
we consider in λ, from 0.42 to 0.62, is consistent with the average change in household
participation from 2011 to 2014 (the dates for which data on the share of individuals with
an account at financial institutions is available) in our sample of EMEs. Furthermore, for the
purposes of analyzing transitional dynamics, a gradual and more limited change in household
participation in the banking system represents a more plausible scenario for the analysis
of transitional dynamics of reforms. Finally, Figures A17 and A18 show the transitional
dynamics when the baseline share of i firms (Ni/N) is lower (Figure A17) and higher (Figure
A18) than the baseline share of 0.26 to highlight how this baseline share affects the transition
to the post-reform economy.
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Figure A14: Transitional Dynamics, Gradual Increase in Bank Competition (10 quarters)
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Figure A15: Transitional Dynamics, Gradual Increase in Household Participation (10 quar-
ters)
71
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
0
5
10
Pe
rc
. D
ev
. f
ro
m
Pr
e-
R
ef
or
m
 S
S
Total Output
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
0
2
4
6
Pe
rc
. D
ev
. f
ro
m
Pr
e-
R
ef
or
m
 S
S
Total Consumption
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
0
2
4
6
8
10
Pe
rc
. D
ev
. f
ro
m
Pr
e-
R
ef
or
m
 S
S
Total Investment
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
-10
-5
0
D
ev
. f
ro
m
Pr
e-
R
ef
or
m
 S
S
10-4 Unemployment
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pe
rc
. D
ev
. f
ro
m
Pr
e-
R
ef
or
m
 S
S
Ni
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Quarters
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
Trade Balance-Output Ratio
Figure A16: Transitional Dynamics, Gradual Joint Increase in Bank Competition and House-
hold Participation (10 quarters)
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Figure A17: Transitional Dynamics, Gradual Joint Increase in Bank Competition and House-
hold Participation (10 quarters), Lower Pre-Reform Ni Share
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Figure A18: Transitional Dynamics, Gradual Joint Increase in Bank Competition and House-
hold Participation (10 quarters), Higher Pre-Reform Ni Share
As the figures suggest, reforms have a short-run adverse effect on consumption and the
trade balance, but an unambiguous positive effect on total output. The temporary adverse
effects are mainly explained by the fact that reforms trigger a reallocation of resources
away from consumption (alongside an increase in foreign indebtedness) to sustain the initial
creation of i firms. In the medium run, the creation of firms, the expansion in investment,
and the resulting expansion in output ultimately allows consumption to rise relative to the
pre-reform equilibrium. In response to the reform, i households not only reduce consumption
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but also temporarily reduce foreign borrowing, resulting in a short-run reduction in the trade
balance-output ratio relative to the pre-reform trend. However, in the long run, the reform
bolsters consumption as well as foreign debt, resulting in a rise in the trade balance-output
ratio.
Welfare Implications Table A2 below characterizes the long- and short-run effects of
individual banking reform on households’ welfare. For illustrative purposes, we consider
increases in λ and H that are consistent with the transitional-dynamics experiments (i.e.,
an increase in λ from 0.42 to 0.62 and a reduction in net interest margins from 4.30 percent
to 1.69 percent).
Following the literature, the long-run welfare effect of banking reform ∆LRj is given by
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
cprj
(
1 +
∆LRj
100
))]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
crj,t
)]
for household category j ∈ {e, i}, where cprj denotes the pre-reform (pr) non-stochastic
steady-state level of consumption and crj,t denotes the (time-varying) level of consumption
under the banking reform for household category j. Then, ∆LRj > 0 implies that a given
reform is welfare-improving in the long run.
Similarly, the short-run welfare effect of banking reform ∆SRj is given by
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
cprj
(
1 +
∆SRj
100
))]
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
crj,t
)]
for household category j ∈ {e, i}, where once again cprj denotes the pre-reform (pr) steady-
state level of consumption and crj,t denotes the (time-varying) level of consumption under
the banking reform for household category j. Of note, as is standard in the literature on the
welfare costs of business cycles, we compute the short-run welfare effects by implementing
a second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions. Then, ∆SRj > 0 implies that
a given reform is welfare improving. Given the large individual reform changes we con-
sider, we present the normalized short-run and long-run welfare changes for each individual
reform (labeled normalized ∆SRj and ∆
LR
j in Table A2). That is, we present the changes
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in welfare associated with a one-percentage-point increase in household participation and a
one-percentage-point reduction in net interest margins, respectively.
Table A2: Long- and Short-Run Welfare Effects of Individual Banking Reforms
Higher λ, Higher H, Higher λ, Higher H,
Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
Ni/N = 0.26 Ni/N = 0.26 Ni/N = 0.56 Ni/N = 0.56
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Effects
Normalized ∆LRi 2.35 4.85 3.14 5.66
Normalized ∆LRe −1.58 1.33 −1.19 2.17
Short-Run Effects
Normalized ∆SRi 3.40 10.93 3.83 9.72
Normalized ∆SRe −1.48 2.17 −1.11 2.90
Notes: Normalized ∆ji (∆
j
e) refers to the value of ∆
j
i (∆
j
e) adjusted for the absolute change in λ (from
0.42 to 0.62; i.e., 20 percentage points) or H (a change in net interest margins from 4.3 percent to 1.69
percent; i.e., a change of 2.61 percentage points) for j ∈ {LR, SR}.
A.11 Business Cycle Moments: Benchmark Model and Richer
Model
Table A3 below shows the business cycle moments (in data-consistent terms, whenever ap-
propriate) generated by the benchmark model under the baseline calibration with a share of
i firms of 0.26. It also shows the same moments generated under a higher λ and H . Finally,
we also show the second moments generated by the richer model presented in Section A.9
above under the baseline (EME) calibration.
Recall that our baseline model is not calibrated to any given economy. Instead, it uses
parameter values that are common in calibrations in the EME literature, as well as calibration
targets for the banking sector and household and firm financial inclusion, that are based
on EME averages in order to capture broad features of representative EMEs. Thus, the
results in Table A2 should be seen as confirming that our benchmark model (and its richer
version where households can allocate their searchers across firm categories) generates broad
business cycle characteristics that are well-known and well-documented in the empirical EME
business cycle literature: a relative volatility of consumption and investment greater than
1; strongly procyclical consumption, investment, and wages; countercyclical unemployment;
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and a countercyclical trade balance-GDP ratio. Of note, the fact that the model faces
limitations in generating high relative unemployment volatility is a well-known reflection of
the Shimer puzzle, a solution to which is beyond the scope of our work.45
Table A3: Business Cycle Moments, Benchmark Model under Baseline Calibration, under Higher λ and H ,
and Richer Model under Baseline Calibration
Second Benchmark Benchmark Model, Richer Model,
Moments Model, Baseline Higher λ and H Baseline
Ni/N = 0.26 Ni/N = 0.26
σcd,t/σYd,t 1.164 0.933 1.234
σinvd,t/σYd,t 5.263 5.700 6.097
σwd,t/σYd,t 1.058 1.067 1.075
σut/σYd,t 0.178 0.217 0.230
corr(cd,t, Y d,t) 0.659 0.516 0.620
corr(invd,t, Y d,t) 0.604 0.554 0.588
corr(wd,t, Y d,t) 0.923 0.890 0.923
corr(ut, Y d,t) −0.909 −0.892 −0.930
corr(tbyt, Y d,t) −0.149 −0.000 −0.177
Notes: tby denotes the trade balance-output ratio. xd,t denotes variable x expressed in data-consistent
(d) terms (see, for example Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori, and Ghironi, 2016a).
45For recent work on the factors that may quantitatively explain the high volatility of unemployment
observed in EMEs, see Finkelstein Shapiro (2017).
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